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In any given week glance through the nation's leading newspapers and popular 
magazines and chances are you will find an article on the nation's medically 
uninsured.  In chiding a country that allows 16% of its citizens to suffer the risks 
associated with that lack of insurance, reference is frequently given to the exemplary 
coverage provided to federal government employees by the Federal Employees Health 
Benefits Program.  What of the benefits provided to state government employees?  
How good is the coverage, and, of particular interest, are there significant variations 
across states and what factors might contribute to those differences? 
This study assesses the level of health care benefits afforded to state 
government employees in all fifty states and considers the potential impact of political 
ideology, political culture, economic conditions and public employee union 
membership in influencing variations in those benefits across the states.  The state 
paid portion of a family’s health care premium was adjusted to allow for differences in 




$318 per month in Mississippi to $1834 per month in New Hampshire.  A state’s 
economic condition, the level of public union membership, and a moralistic political 
culture were all shown to have a positive association with the level of benefits.  
Political ideology, defined as the degree of liberalism, was, however, not shown to 
have a statistical association.   
Understanding health care benefit differences between states and the factors 
that drive those differences has the potential of improving lives and the functioning of 
state governments.  Scant information on those differences exist in the current 
literature; this study has developed a baseline of information and an assessment of 
driving influences that will, hopefully, stimulate additional approaches and research 
efforts.  Benefits, in general, have been shown in the literature to impact the ability of 
state governments to attract and maintain employees of merit.  Advocates of increased 
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CHAPTER  I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In any given week glance through the nation's leading newspapers and popular 
magazines and chances are you will find an article on the nation's medically uninsured.  
In chiding a country that allows 16% of its citizens to suffer the risks associated with that 
lack of insurance, reference is frequently given to the exemplary coverage provided to 
federal government employees by the Federal Employees Health Benefits Program.  
What of the benefits provided to state government employees?  How good is the 
coverage, and, of particular interest, are there significant variations across states and what 
factors might contribute to those differences? 
The plight of the medically uninsured certainly has far greater individual impact 
than whether government employee in State A receives health benefit XX while 
government employee in State B receives health benefit YY.  The uninsured may simply 
fall through the cracks failing to obtain medical care or obtain it substantially later in the 
disease process contributing to potentially negative health outcomes.  Further, it has been 
shown (Shi, 2000) that the uninsured fail to gain the same quality of care as the insured.  
Nevertheless, the reasons for the differences between State A's employee health benefits 
and those of State B should provide insight into the impetus behind state employee 
benefit packages - packages that can assist state governments in their effort to attract and 




The primary questions to be addressed by this research are: 
 Are there significant differences in healthcare benefits provided to state 
government employees across the 50 states? 
 If variations are found to exist, what possible factors contribute to such 
differences? 
The answers to these questions will, hopefully, benefit the work of state employee 
benefit managers.  The availability and affordability of health care is a significant 
concern in today's society; what we can learn from the differing degrees of what states 
provide for their employees, and the reasons for those differences, may offer insight into 
improving benefits for others.  
It is particularly significant that this research is being conducted at this particular 
point in time.  Facing ever escalating health care costs for their employees, state 
governments are looking at alternative forms of health coverage.  Health savings 
accounts and tiered coverage plans (with multiple premium costs) are emerging as states 
attempt to balance employee expectations with increased financial pressures.  As these 
and other forms of coverage emerge and gain acceptance with employees, the many 
diverse forms of coverage will increase the difficulty of the researcher in finding a 
common base and definition of coverage across states.  Comparisons will be difficult at 
best and prone to potential measurement error.  Now is the precise time to conduct this 
research and assess the factors that contribute to variations in benefit packages.  
Structural changes in offerings may impede future research.  However, the contributing 
factors are likely to remain stable over a longer period of time even as it becomes more 




This dissertation will assess the level of health care benefits afforded to state 
government employees in all fifty states.  The research will consider the potential impact 
of political ideology, political culture, economic conditions and public employee union 
membership in influencing variations in benefits across the states.  The following review 
of the literature will provide an understanding for the choice of factors thought likely to 




CHAPTER  II 
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
Background 
With the exception of a 2003 study by the Kaiser Family Foundation (see below), 
the literature has not addressed the question of differences in state employee health 
benefits among states.  When attempting to understand the issue, there are four questions 
we need to consider before proceeding with the research: 1) Why is this an important 
issue? 2) What do we already know about it? 3) What might account for the differences? 
and 4) How might we best investigate the issue?  In answering these questions it is 
necessary to look broadly through the literature focusing on related research such as 
employee benefits in general and the significance of health care benefits to government 
employees irrespective of differences between states.  Partial answers will provide initial 
grounding for this research effort. 
Before looking at these questions, it is beneficial to look at the origins of 
employer-based health care insurance and to assess the motivations behind providing 
such benefits.  Perhaps one of the earliest recorded instances of "health insurance" in the 
United States took place in 1798 when the United States government required the owners 
of merchant ships to develop a "sickness fund" and deposit twenty cents per month for 
each seaman they employed ("History", 2003).  This, however, was in reality more akin 




it, did not truly develop in the United States until the 1930s.  Prior to that time, medical 
technology was at such a primitive stage in its development that the true costs of illness 
were dominated by loss of work, not medical expenses. 
It is often assumed that war time wage freezes, excess-profits tax and tax-exempt 
status of health insurance payments led to the growth in employer-sponsored health 
insurance (Glied, 2005).  However, Dobbins (1992), utilizing data from the National 
Industrial Conference Board (NICB) between 1928 and 1946, disputes the general belief 
that benefits (pensions and health insurance) rose in response to wartime federal policy 
changes and industrial factors.  His findings show that the rise in health benefits preceded 
the war-related wage freeze, excess-profits tax, and benefit tax exemption rules.  In fact, 
for businesses with fewer than 250 employees, the prevalence of health and/or accident 
insurance rose from 11% in 1928 to 25.7% in 1939 and for businesses with more than 
250 employees the prevalence increased from 15.5% in 1928 to 38.3% in 1939 (p. 1424). 
The theory advanced by Dobbins "links public policy to interest group goals and 
in turn to organizational outcomes" (p. 1445).  He sees "interest group goals as an 
intermediate variable between environmental context and organizational outcomes" (p. 
1445).  Case law arising out of the Wagner Act led businesses to want to increase 
insurance to "subvert unionism" (p. 1434) while unions fought to win the rights to 
bargain over fringe benefits.  Thus, to Dobbins, the primary impetus behind employer-
sponsored health insurance is the desire to increase employee loyalty to the organization. 
While Dobbins built a strong case for the pre-war growth in benefits and the 
desire of industries to build worker loyalty, he did not adequately diffuse the attribution 




benefit tax exemption rules.  Though he established a growth trajectory prior to the war 
related economic policies, he did not explain the greater expansion of benefits during the 
war years.  From 1939 to 1946 health and/or accident insurance grew from 25.7% to 
53.3% for smaller firms and from 38.3% to 67.2% for larger companies (p.1424). 
In either case it would appear that the provision of health care benefits was 
perceived by industry as a means of increasing worker loyalty and that various public 
policies, whether socially driven (Wagner Act) or economically motivated (war time 
policies), served as an incentive for industry action benefiting workers. 
 
Why is this an important issue? 
In terms of importance, numerous studies have verified the significance of 
employee benefits in attracting and retaining public service employees.  Light (1999, 
p.96), in a study of what motivates public servants to serve, found that 25% of 
respondents (graduates of the country's top public policy and administration graduate 
programs) ranked benefits as a "very important consideration" on their first job, while 
41% ranked them as a "very important consideration" in their current position.  The 
increase is likely reflective of the growing importance of benefits as individuals age.  
Investigating the relative importance employees place on various job values, Karl and 
Sutton ( 1998, p.521) found public sector employees ranked benefits as number five out 
of a list of sixteen potential values.  In a more recent study, Light (2003) found that 19% 
of college seniors had given very serious consideration to working for state or local 
government.  Survey results were analyzed of a random sample of about-to-graduate 




someone who wanted good benefits.  In terms of attributes valued in a job, benefits 
ranked second with 63% of respondents saying it was an important consideration.  
Benefits ranked behind opportunity to help people (67%) and tied with opportunity to do 
challenging work, but placed substantially ahead of salary that garnered a mere 30% 
response rate. 
Based upon a 1991 Gallup poll, Caggiano (1991) reported that 81% of 
respondents (public and private sector individuals) ranked health insurance and other 
benefits as very important job characteristics compared to 78% for interesting work and 
56% for high income.  Additionally, only 27% said they were satisfied with their current 
level of health insurance and other benefits. 
In a study of employee attitudes toward benefit packaging, Fredericksen and 
Soden (1998, p.29) found that 84.7% of the surveyed public sector employees in El Paso 
perceived health insurance benefits as of "great importance".  In a listing of twenty-seven 
benefits available to public employees in a large Midwestern city, Bergmann, Bergmann 
and Grahn (1994, p.401-403) found health care ranked second in general importance 
behind retirement; fringe benefits as a whole were rated as between "very important" and 
"extremely important" in retention.  This finding relates to Selden and Moynihan's (2000, 
p.63) observation that state human resource management practices impact state quit rates.  
The 1997 turnover rate in state government was approximately 8% compared to 
approximately 6% in the private sector.  The quality of the employees that exit produce 
additional concerns.  In a 1997 study of public sector employment exits, Crewson found 
voluntary exits from state government scored 4.3% higher on the Armed Forces 




those who had not voluntarily left state government.  The depletion in quality is greatest 
at the managerial level where there was nearly an 18-percentile score advantage for those 
voluntarily leaving over those who did not voluntarily exit.  The one other statistically 
significant finding was a 6.7% score advantage for the male voluntary exiters, across all 
categories of state public employment, above those who did not voluntarily exit.  If, as 
Selden and Moynihan contend, state quit rates are impacted by human resource 
management practices, then deficient health care benefit packages could contribute to a 
diminishing quality of state employees in light of the NLSY results. 
For employees that stay, Daley (1998, p.7) states that health insurance can aid in 
alleviating "health-related threats to motivation and productivity".  Hayes and Kearney 
(2001, p. 591), in a survey of public personnel managers, ranked health care benefits as 
being of the greatest importance to the practice of human resource management both in 
the year 2000 and, as they looked ahead, in 2008. 
Reflecting upon Maslow's (1943) seminal work on human motivation, if you 
conceive of health as a physiological need and health care benefits as a safety need then 
when either of those are in jeopardy you are blocked from love (affection and 
belongingness), esteem (self-respect, self-esteem, and the esteem of others) and self-
actualization goals (becoming all that one is capable of becoming).  McGregor (2001) has 
said, "Since every industrial employee is in a dependent relationship, safety needs may 
assume considerable importance." (p.180).  Herzberg (1968) focuses on the benefits of 
motivators, and does not adequately address the actual impact of hygiene factors such as 
benefits.  He does, however, state, " Unless the ante (referring to fringe benefits in 




company is turning back the clock." (p.55).  Hygiene factors are maintenance factors; by 
themselves they do not provide satisfaction, but are seen by Herzberg as necessary for 
avoiding dissatisfaction.  Health care benefits clearly play a role in employee 
contentment and can, theoretically, be a source of dissatisfaction. 
Though Herzberg failed to deal with the consequences of job dissatisfaction, 
Withey and Cooper (1989) utilized dissatisfaction to predict exit, voice, loyalty, or 
neglect as strategies adopted by graduates of a Canadian college school of business 
employed throughout North America.  The researchers found that individuals were more 
likely to consider and actually leave an organization if they perceived the costs of leaving 
were low, thought the risk of voicing their dissatisfaction too high, lacked hope that the 
current situation would improve, were not committed to the organization, and had a 
viable career alternative available.  The authors did not provide demographic 
information, leaving one wondering if exiting may be a strategy more likely utilized by 
younger people with less vested in a position and an organization.  Neglect may be a 
more likely outcome for a more experienced employee where the cost of exiting is high.  
Neglecters tend to hurt an organization from within and not leave though they perceive 
conditions as better elsewhere. 
Beyond state employees themselves, might others be impacted by the variation in 
benefits across states?  In a discussion by Glenn (2005, p. A21-A22), relating to colleges' 
and universities' difficulties with the growing cost of health care coverage, he maintains 
that some educational institutions have addressed the problem with increasing tuition, 




recent strikes at Northeastern Illinois University and the City Colleges of Chicago and as 
an impetus to the growth of unionism in higher education. 
With rising health care costs and sluggish state economies, improving benefit 
packages may be a difficult task for a state to accomplish.  In fact, in Streib's (1996, p.69) 
study of health care plans in municipal governments, a decline in benefit levels was noted 
in the public sector.  What was of particular interest to Streib was the lack of research or 
debate in the public administration literature relevant to the emerging cutbacks in 
benefits; this was cited in stark contrast to the continuous discussion of this topic in the 
private employment sector.  In a similar vein, Davis and Ward (1995, p. 257) maintain 
that minimal research has been conducted on equity considerations in reference to 
employee benefits.  Allocation and perceived fairness of allocation of benefits may, 
according to the researchers, be strong determinants of job satisfaction in both the private 
and public sectors.  Given the growing costs of health care coverage, and the resulting 
need to change means and levels of coverage, benefit satisfaction may play an 
increasingly important role for employers' consideration.  Vroom (1964), in his early 
writings on equity and job satisfaction, did state that though rewards were most 
frequently interpreted to mean wages, the model was applicable for any form of reward. 
Adams’ (1965) theory of inequity assumes that whenever an individual perceives 
that the ratio of his or her outcomes to inputs is unequal to the ratio of another's outcomes 
to inputs that dissatisfaction will arise from the state of inequity.  Further, the individual 
will be motivated to either achieve equity or reduce the degree of the inequity.  In a study 
of clerical workers in an industrial setting, Dittrich and Carrell (1979), found a significant 




they found a significant relationship between absence rates and employee turnover.  
However, they postulated that the decision to leave an organization permanently may be 
more directly affected by the availability of external opportunities.  Though there was a 
relationship between absence and turnover, none of the fairness (i.e. equity) variables in 
the study were statistically significant with turnover.  While equity theory is frequently 
linked with commitment in the literature, Scholl (1981) argues that the two are separate 
independent variables; he maintains that an individual who perceives her or himself in an 
inequitable situation may well still remain "committed" to an organization for such 
possible reasons as personal investment in the organization, reciprocity, lack of 
alternatives, and identification amongst others. 
How might the theory of inequity work within state government?  Who is the 
"referent other" that a state employee would use for comparison purposes?  Would an 
employee in Mississippi perceive inequity if they thought the health benefits for state 
employees in Minnesota were significantly better?  Pritchard (1969) contends that an 
internal standard exists by which one measures if his or her own inputs are greater than 
his or her own outputs.  Based upon this internal standard, an individual will experience 
discomfort whether or not comparison individuals are seen to be in a similar situation.  
The internal standard arises from an individual's "past experience in exchange 
relationships and his knowledge of the 'market value' of various inputs." (p 205-206).  In 
studying the impact of inequity on the health of Finnish workers, Taris, Kalimo, & 
Schaufeli (2002) found the internal standard performed at least as well as the 




If a referent other is being used, rather than an internal standard, Pritchard (1969) 
points out another consideration is the proximity of the "other" used for comparison.  The 
more distant, the less likely the individual will be sensitive to over-reward (the individual 
considers him/herself overly rewarded for their inputs compared to the other), but under-
reward always leads to dissatisfaction.  Williams (1995) in a study of benefit satisfaction 
amongst public librarians suggested that, 
Although an employer cannot choose the referents that employees may 
decide to use, employers could provide data on benefits provided by 
comparable organizations in order to influence these comparisons.  To the 
extent that these comparisons are favorable for the employer, benefit level 
satisfaction may be enhanced. (p. 1122). 
 
Thus, we might postulate that employees with less rigorous health insurance packages 
might perceive themselves in an inequitable position whether they are making a direct 
comparison to another individual or basing it on an internal standard.  Taking Williams' 
advice, states with above average benefit packages might provide comparison data to 
ward off potential senses of inequity.  Though it is reasonable to assume that a state 
government employee in a particular state is probably more likely to compare his or her 
health benefits with those in the local labor market, knowledge of benefits provided to 
state government workers in other states might influence ones internal standard of 
measurement. 
 The framing of public service benefit packages is an important consideration.  
The quality of coverage and the variance between states is an issue worthy of the 
attention of public administration research; contrasts with the private sector may be 




In an era of a compressed workforce and increasing competition for good 
workers, and where health and retirement plans in the private sector are 
threatened, even bankrupt, benefits may be the factor that attracts and 
keeps good employees.  These benefits should be considered a public 
sector advantage instead of a burden. (p. 300) 
 
Paddock's words are particularly noteworthy when considered in combination 
with Lewis &Frank's (2002) finding that between 1988 and 1998 there was a one-third 
drop (from 28% to 19%) in the number of respondents to the General Social Survey 
(GSS) that professed a preference for government versus private sector employment.  
Add to that the factor that in a 2000 survey of Georgia state employees (Kellough & 
Nigro), only 57.7% of respondents thought their benefits were competitive with those 
available in the private sector. 
Another aspect of importance is the potential impact of state governments on the 
health care market place.  Maxwell, Temin, and Petigara's (2004) research, based upon a 
2002 survey, indicated that state governments purchased health insurance for more than 4 
million employees and retirees, millions more dependents, and approximately 1.5 million 
individuals associated with other public agencies, state universities, municipalities and, in 
some instances, children in state-subsidized programs.  A report by the Milbank 
Memorial Fund (2005) stated that health care-related expenditures for state government 
employees totaled $26.8 billion in FY 2002 and grew to $29.4 billion in FY 2003.  The 
totals represent the amount state governments paid for health insurance premiums for 
their employees, the medical portion of workers' compensation, the Medicare payroll 
taxes paid on behalf of state employees as well as employee contributions to health 
insurance premiums and to flexible spending accounts; more than 70% of the totals are 




billion in FY 2003).  Such spending represented 2.5% of total state spending in FY 2002 
and 2.6% of total state spending in FY 2003. 
 Towers Perrin (2005) in a survey of employers in the private sector, found an 
anticipated average increase in health care expenditure of $597 per employee in 2006.  Of 
that, it was expected that $442 would be borne by the employer and $155 by the 
employee.  Between 2000 and 2005, the Kaiser Foundation (n.d.) reports that insurance 
premiums in the private sector grew by 73% while cumulative inflation advanced by 
approximately 14% and cumulative wage growth registered 15%. 
The amount of money flowing into the health care marketplace is also a reflection 
of the nation's tax bill.  As Woolhander and Himmelstein (2002) point out, when the 
Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services publish the government's share of health 
spending in the country they do not include public employees' health benefits.  Public 
employee health benefits (federal, state, and local) cost taxpayers $52.4 billion in 1999 
and represented 5.4% of the nation's total health care expenditures.  The federal 
government is the largest purchaser of private health insurance in the country, followed 
by the state of California. 
In addition to today’s rising health care costs, what of tomorrow’s?  A recent 
Governmental Accounting Standards Board (GASB) ruling requires state governments to 
report the costs associated with post-employment benefits.  Unfunded liabilities for the 
future health care and non-pension benefit costs of current employees and emerging Baby 
Boomers may be substantial.  A study by Credit Suisse indicated that such underfunding 
could be in excess of $50 billion in California, New Jersey and New York.  Variations are 




no unfunded liabilities and those for North Dakota and Wyoming being estimated at less 
than $100 million (National Conference of State Legislatures, 2007). 
Taking the economic impact down to the individual employee level, the Health 
Confidence Survey of 2007 (Employee Benefit Research Institute) found that 63% of 
Americans with health insurance experienced an increase in costs they were responsible 
for paying in the past year.  The increase in costs led 30% of those affected to reduce 
their contributions to retirement saving and 53% to reduce other savings.  Additionally, 
the increased costs resulted in 36% having difficulty in paying bills, while paying for 
basic necessities impacted 29% of those experiencing health care cost increases. 
Increased costs or not, however, employer-provided insurance remained critically 
important to those with such coverage.  Given a choice between $7,500 in additional 
taxable income or $7,500 in additional health benefits, 76% chose the additional benefits.  
Those preferring to keep their coverage responded that it would take an additional 
$12,000 (median response) in taxable income to give up their current coverage. 
 
What do we already know about it? 
The Federal Employees Health Benefits Program has frequently been cited as a 
model for health system reform, but relatively little research has looked at the health 
benefits of state and local public employees.  The 1997 Robert Woods Johnson 
Foundation Employer Health Information Survey did find that state governments 
contribute more to the cost of employee health insurance premiums than do private sector 




A 2003 study by the Kaiser Family Foundation confirmed the Robert Woods 
Johnson findings; Kaiser observed that state governments pay 5% more of the average 
single employee premium and 4% more of the average family premium.  This increased 
proportion is, however, somewhat mitigated, at least in terms of individual coverage, by 
an 8.2% higher single employee total premium for state government employee coverage; 
total family premiums average 3% lower for state governments as compared to the 
private sector (The Kaiser Family Foundation, 2003, p.2).  More interestingly, for the 
purpose of this research, was the range of premium rates; the total monthly family 
premium varied from a low of $429 in Montana to a high of $1110 in Maine (p.7).  The 
difference in premium rates is likely to be indicative of differences in benefit coverage 
and structures between states. 
 In a further comparison between the private and public sector, the Kaiser 
Foundation (n.d.) has shown that the percentage of premium increase costs of large 
public purchasing programs such as FEHBP and CalPERS has largely mirrored that of 
private employers, showing a similar general pattern from 1993-2003.  An exception was 
noted for CalPERS in 2002 and 2003 when its percent increases were significantly higher 
than the private sectors and FEHBP's.  If there were a variance between states in their 
ability to contain costs this could well affect the benefits offered.  In a later Kaiser 
Foundation study (Gabel et al, 2005) it was noted that private sector premiums rose 9.2% 
from spring 2004 to spring 2005; this increase outpaced both the overall inflation rate and 
workers wages each by almost 6 percentage points.  Since 2000, health care premiums in 
the private sector have risen 73%.  Strunk and Ginsberg (2003), commenting on a Towers 




premiums were being passed on to employees the proportion of the total they were 
required to pay was being held fairly constant (approximately 22% for family coverage). 
In a 2005 study of Bureau of Labor Statistics data, McDonnell found that total 
compensation costs were 46% higher per hour worked for state and local government 
workers as compared to private sector employees while employee benefit costs were 61% 
higher.  Most interestingly, health insurance benefits were 123% higher and averaged 
$3.66 per hour worked for state and local government employees as compared to $1.64 
per hour worked for private sector employees.  Braden and Hyland (1993) attributed 
differences in wage and benefit costs of public and private sector employees to various 
factors, most particularly differences in work activities and occupational structures.  
Given government's need to provide for public education and safety they employ a larger 
proportion of white-collar professionals and highly skilled service occupation personnel. 
 In contrast to McDonnell's findings on wage rates, Watts, Christianson, 
Heineccius and Trude's (2003) analysis of the 2001 Community Tracking Study data 
indicated that public employers perceived public wage scales as lower when compared to 
private wages.  This led the public employers to the conclusion that benefits were playing 
an increasingly important role in attempting to develop a competitive compensation 
package.  Further, the researchers reported the belief that public employers "raised the 
bar" on what plans were offered in the private employment market (p. 176).  Anecdotally, 
reference was made to the potential of public employers being concerned about their 
impact on players in the health care market.  The authors cited an example of New Jersey 
possibly making less than financially advantageous choices in constructing their 




market.  New Jersey has a significant number of health care and pharmaceutical 
employers located within the state. 
 Though seen as "raising the bar" on benefit packages, the authors also cite a 
concern by public employers that they are losing their leverage in negotiating with 
insurance plans.  As the total number of available plans shrinks, government employees 
represent a smaller percentage of a plan's insured.  Though 33% of CalPers (the 
California public employees' insurance organization) members are enrolled in Kaiser 
plans, they represent only 5% of Kaiser's membership (p.177).  The result has been 
CalPers considering reducing the number of offered plans or moving to one self-funded 
state plan.  Market pressures such as these obviously have the ultimate result of limiting 
employee choice. 
 As in the New Jersey example cited above, the financially advantageous choice is 
not always made.  The Louisiana state legislature has prohibited the state health plan 
from utilizing mail order pharmacies in their benefit offering.  Though the mail order 
option would reduce administrative costs and provide the state with an ability to negotiate 
greater discounts and rebates, retail pharmacies successfully lobbied their case with state 
lawmakers (National Association of State Personnel Executives, 2006). 
 Whether consistently making financially advantageous choices or not, costs are 
rising for the states.  Based upon a survey of state government human resources managers 
conducted by the International Public Management Association for Human Resources on 
healthcare benefits cost management in state and local government, Chiapetta (2005) 
reported that 41% of respondents reported a cost increase of between 11 and 20% from 




public agencies either had or intended to make changes in their health care plans within 
the next year.  The key strategy employed by those that had made changes in the last 
three years was cost shifting to employees.  Examples provided were: 
 33% increased employee premium and office visit co-pay amount. 
 30% increased deductibles 
 20% increased both employee share of the premium and reduced the benefit plan 
structure 
 17% increased employee payments for coinsurance 
Hurley, Felland, Gerland, and Pickreign (2006), examining data from the 2005 
Community Tracking Study, likewise found some public employers have initiated design 
changes in an attempt to control or moderate costs.  One example incorporated tiered 
employee premiums, wherein the University of California system initiated a graduated 
premium contribution plan based on salary/wage ranges with four different levels.  South 
Carolina  and Arkansas have begun offering high deductible health plans in conjunction 
with health savings accounts; the take -up numbers in South Carolina were merely 100 
out of 30,000 eligible.  Nevertheless, minimal structural changes were observed.  In 
addition to the University of California, Workplace Economics, Inc. (2005), reported that 
Illinois, Kansas, New Mexico, and West Virginia had initiated plans where employee 
premium payments were keyed to salary levels. 
Overall, Reddick (2007) found that state and local governments provide higher cost 
health care coverage, but fewer plan and alternative care options than the private sector.  




POS options, nor were they as likely to offer high deductible health plans or health care 
savings accounts as those available in the private sector. 
As we look to state governments to see the issues and decisions surrounding the 
provision of health care benefits, it is necessary to consider where those decisions are 
reached.  According to Berry (2000), all states, with the exception of Texas, have a 
centralized personnel function and within forty-seven of the states primary responsibility 
for personnel functions, including benefit determination, reside within a single personnel 
office.  Boulard (2004), referencing D. Cauchi of the National Council of State 
Legislatures, said that though the executive branch in all fifty states oversees the 
employee health insurance plans, legislative involvement may be seen in such policy 
determinations as who is eligible and what portion of premiums will be paid by the 
employee.  Additionally, legislatures may have considerable leverage when appropriating 
the annual funds to sustain employee insurance programs. 
 
What might account for the differences? 
The dissertation will look at differences in political ideology, political culture, 
economic conditions, and the role of pressure groups in influencing variation in health 
care benefits across the states. 
 
Political ideology 
Political ideology has been defined by Burden, Caldeira and Groseclose (2000) as 
"a latent set of values that organizes personal political attitudes" (p. 237).  The dominant 




Researchers have argued that public sentiment shifts in favor of a more liberal 
policy agenda in expectation of (Durr, 1993) or in the face of (Stevenson, 2001) a strong 
economy.  Conversely, a more conservative policy agenda is supported in anticipation of, 
or in light of, a declining economy.  Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1987) contend that the 
expression of policy ideology by a state legislature is manifested over time and shaped by 
multiple legislative decisions.  They maintain that the enactment of the most liberal 
policies is associated with the most liberal states as are conservative policies with 
conservative states.  In later research (Erikson, Wright and McIver, 1989), they conclude 
that the ideology of the state legislature helps to determine the direction of state policy; 
however, the ideological bent of the legislators is tempered by state public opinion.  
Barilleaux, Holbrook, and Langer (2002) argue, however, that the degree to which 
liberalism or conservatism is expressed in policy consequences is a result of both inter-
party competition and legislative balance.  The example proffered is that "Democrats that 
dominate state legislatures but were elected in close races exert greater changes in 
welfare spending effort than Democrats with identical numbers of seats who were elected 
under less competitive elections" (p.415).  Their findings indicate that supposedly liberal 
parties may temper their ideological bent based upon the degree of electoral competition.  
Coggburn and Schneider (2003) developed a model that indicated that 51% of states' 
policy priorities were influenced by the combined effects of government ideology, citizen 
ideology, size of state government, and management capacity; each of the independent 
variables proved to be statistically significant at the .05 level. 
How ideology is expressed may be debated, but as Erikson and Tedin (2003) have 




necessary to understand the language of politics as it is practiced by political elites." 
(p.74).  Political ideology also may play a more dominant role in reference to some 
policy areas versus others.  Kingdon (2003, p. 134), in his study of national policy 




Separate from ideology is the concept of a political culture.  In an effort to assist 
researchers to better define ideology, Gerring (1997) maintains that frequently the term 
ideology is misused when political culture would be the more appropriate term.  In 
distinguishing between the two terms, the author states, "Political culture is generally 
considered to be less dogmatic, less action-oriented, referring as much to political 
procedures as to the substance of politics, and is much more likely to be defined as a set 
of (unconscious) practices" (p. 982). 
Elazar (1966, p. 79) defined political culture as "the particular pattern of 
orientation to political action in which each political system is imbedded."  This pattern 
of orientation emanates from the "historical experiences of groups of people" (p.84).  
While the United States as a whole may be seen as having one general political culture, 
Elazar maintains that this is an amalgam of three distinct subcultures that can be defined 
and which reflect migration and settlement patterns of distinct groups of immigrants.  The 
three subcultures are designated as individualistic, moralistic, and traditionalistic.  
Though variations and combinations occur within parts of a state, Elazar has assigned a 




individualistic culture model accentuates private concerns and believes in limiting 
government action to functions demanded by the public and, primarily, actions that 
encourage private initiative.  The model representative of a moralistic political culture 
sees government as a positive instrument in promoting the public good; it represents a 
more activist government involved in attempting to improve economic and social 
conditions.  The third model, the traditionalistic political culture, assumes a hierarchical 
society wherein government is dominated by those at the top of the social order; their 
goal is to maintain the existing social order. 
Though the conceptual modeling of "political culture" is most frequently 
attributed to Elazar, Kim's (1964) research indicates that the term was in fact first used by 
Almond in 1956.  Almond (1956) defined political culture as "a particular pattern of 
orientations to political action" (p. 396).  In subsequent works, Almond (1989) 
maintained that such values as civic obligation and trust were affected by the historical 
and life experiences of a nation and groups within nations.  This resonates with Elazar's 
conclusion that political cultures are influenced by migration and settlement patterns. 
The concept of political culture and the staying power of Elazar's initial state 
designations have been debated in the literature.  It is, to begin with, as Gray et al (1999) 
have said, intuitively appealing to many researchers; "it is consistent with general 
impressions about state differences in political values, style, and tone" (p.24).  
Abramowitz (1989) saw Elazar's categorizations (moralistic, traditionalistic, and 
individualistic) as "largely impressionistic" yet worthy of further study (p.184).  
However, a common criticism of Elazar's categorization is an assumption that political 




Johnson's earlier work (1976), contend that religious data is an enhanced proxy for state 
political culture and would shift a number of states from moralistic and traditionalistic 
models to the individualistic model.  Hero (1998) criticizes Elazar's reliance on the 
migration patterns of Europeans that Hero views as discounting the political values and 
beliefs of non-Europeans and racial minorities.  African American influence is minimized 
and recognition of increasing immigration of Latino and Asian populations since the 
1960s is, according to Hero, not addressed.  Disputing Hero's emphasis on the impact of 
the distribution of racial and ethnic groups, Sharp (2005) does see the emergence of "new 
political cultures" or "unconventional cultures".  However, the researcher attributes the 
strength of these new constructs to such postindustrial characteristics as increased 
educational roles, changing women's social roles, nontraditional household arrangements, 
and decline in traditional religious attachments. 
Various scholars take the approach of faulting aspects of Elazar's schema, but 
accepting that the basic differences do exist.  Dye (1988) points out that there is an 
increasing homogeneity of state and regional cultures brought about by increased 
mobility, national television, movies, and music.  However, he contends that sufficient 
variation exists to merit comparative analysis.  Lowery and Sigelman (1982) contend that 
Elazar failed to present evidence that the mass publics of the states did in fact hold the 
attitudes core to the defined political subcultures.  Further, their analysis of NES survey 
data led them to the conclusion that, in terms of attitudes related to mass political 
participation and scope of government policy making, distinctions between the three 




Even though the mass publics of the three cultures may not vary 
systematically in their basic political attitudes, it nonetheless remains 
possible that political elites - those who exercise the greatest influence on 
public policy making - do develop certain deeply rooted political 
orientations, which are tied to basic cultural values.  (p. 383) 
 
The assumption that perhaps the actions of political elites, as opposed to general public 
opinion, are more representative of political cultures was an earlier finding of Welch and 
Peters (1980) and Schlitz and Rainey (1978).  However, Savage (1981) has disputed 
Schlitz and Rainey's discounting of the general public's placement within Elazar's 
subcultures, contending that their methodology emphasized an assessment of current 
situations rather than core values. 
In terms more specific to this research, Fitzpatrick and Hero (1988) found that 
moralistic states made greater use of merit systems and demonstrated greater economic 
equality among its citizens.  If we consider these outcomes to be surrogates for fairness to 
employees, we may see a similar effect in the provision of health care benefits.  
Sharkansky (1978, p. 40) claims that states scoring high on moralism tend to have large 
numbers of public employees that receive high salaries and generous benefits.  In a study 
of state and local government expenditures, Miller (1991) found a positive association 
between higher state expenditures on health programs and states with a moralistic culture.  
It was particularly noteworthy that the researcher found that the states with a moralistic 
culture did not vary significantly in their total spending even though their tax capacity, 
population density, heterogeneity, and income was less than that of the individualistic 
states.  Part of this is a reflection of the finding that expenditures are generally higher for 




opposite is true in individualistic states.  This finding has obvious implications if we are 
looking at benefits provided at a state level. 
Boekelman (1991) sought to understand the impact of political culture on state 
economic development policies.  One interesting finding was that, as expected, states 
with a moralistic culture were more inclined to support policies focusing on citizen-
oriented opportunities such as increasing high-quality jobs rather than ones focused on 
business incentives; however, there was a variation between the more industrialized and 
the more rural of the moralistic states.  Greater policy efforts were evident in the more 
industrialized states.  Boekelman attributed this difference to the possibility that 
unionization in an industrialized state offers the potential for additional political 
leadership on policy issues.  Along with Welch and Peters (1980) and Schlitz and Rainey 
(1978) cited earlier, Boekelman appears to agree with the proposition that the impact of 
political culture is more evident in the behavior of political elites than in that of the mass 
public.  He finds this to be particularly true in addressing complex issues. 
A more current look at state budgets in relation to Elazar's construct can be found 
in the work of Koven and Mausolff (2002).  In an initial cut at the data, they showed 
differences in the average per capita expenditures for the three types of political cultures 
for various categories of state government expenditures between 1992 and 1996.  The 
moralistic states expended the highest average per capita amount for all categories, 
including the health, hospital, and public welfare classifications.  Though this method of 
analysis controlled for differences in population size it did not address the influence of 
economic conditions and political variances.  A model was constructed that controlled for 




to show the impact of political culture on state spending with a $264 per capita spending 
difference between each category when viewing total state expenditures.  When tested on 
individual categories of spending, political culture was significantly correlated only with 
educational and hospital spending.  The authors conclude, "Despite the age of Elazar's 
cultural system and ongoing demographic changes, the culture-expenditure link remains 
intact" (p. 74). 
Adding credence to the significance of political culture is Erikson, McIver, and 
Wright's (1987) analysis of CBS/New York Times public opinion survey data collected 
between 1976 and 1982.  The researchers concluded that state political culture, defined as 
"that portion of public opinion that cannot be accounted for by the group characteristics 
of the state electorate", dominated state demography as a basis of state-to-state 
differences in opinion (p.798).  Partisanship and ideology were not mere derivatives of a 
state's demographic composition, but reflective of the distinctive political context of a 
given state.  Rosenthal (1984) sees elements such as life experiences and environmental 
variables as the sources of political culture with the outcomes being actions, institutions, 
and policies.  Similarly, Morris, Travis, Breaux, and Poulin (2002) found that "political 
culture is something other than an agglomeration of other variables" drawn from the 
political culture literature such as political, economic, and socio-demographic factors 
(p.15); political culture was found to be about attitudes. 
 
Economic conditions 
 Turning to the potential impact of economic conditions, Roberts (2001, Public 




government attempts to manage the growing costs of health care benefits were focused 
on displacement rather than structural solutions.  Such tactics as higher taxes and 
increased employee co-payments were favored over solutions believed more likely to 
reduce total costs such as benefit consortiums and self-insurance.  It would seem that 
such approaches, if followed by state governments in tight economic conditions, would 
likely trigger a greater reduction in the level of benefits. 
 In a study of state Medicaid spending, Buchanan, Cappelleri & Ohsfeklt (1991) 
measured the impact of both economic conditions and political ideology on the level of 
expenditures.  The researchers found that economic conditions, rather than ideology, had 
a significant impact on state Medicaid spending levels.  It will be interesting to see the 
similarities or differences when these factors are applied to public employee insurance 
versus that for the states' poor and disabled. 
In contrast, Jacoby and Schneider's (2001) study of state program expenditures in 
1992 showed no linkage between state policy priorities and state wealth, generosity, 
and/or funding sources.  These researchers found policy priorities to be largely 
determined by public opinion and interest group activity within the states.  Hwang and 
Gray (1991) differ and see that wealth, defined as the per person capita income, is an 
important determinant of state spending. 
 The potential impact of economic conditions on public employees' health care 
insurance can, however, be seen in Holahan et al's (2004) study of state responses to their 
2004 budget crises.  A number of the states studied responded to the demands of a slow 
economy by increasing the proportion of insurance premiums paid for by state workers.  




employee's unions.  Perhaps economic conditions will also be seen to moderate any 
potential affect of pressure groups.  In a national study of municipal government benefit 
managers, Roberts (2001, Public Performance & Management Review) noted that health 
benefits were the number one benefit practice cited as contributing to fiscal stress, 
mentioned by 82.4% of respondents. (p. 394). 
Rising health care costs in the face of fixed and declining state budgets are, as 
Maxwell, Temin, and Petigara (2004) have pointed out a particular problem since state 
governments, unlike the federal government and private enterprise, are required to 
balance their budgets annually.  The researchers cite the National Governors Association 
claim that state deficits in 2002 amounted to $30 billion and were estimated to grow to 
approximately $82 billion in 2004.  At the same time, states were anticipating double-
digit percentage increases in health care costs in the coming years.  However, since those 
projections were made, the National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.) has reported 
that state budget conditions are improving albeit being tempered by increasing demands 
for spending.  By the end of the first quarter of FY 2006, nineteen states were reporting 
budget overruns in comparison to twenty-three at the same point in FY 2002.  When the 
Center for Studying Health System Change (Regopoulos & Trude, 2004) surveyed 
private employer's responses to a slowing economy and rapidly increasing health 
insurance premiums, they found employers tending towards incremental changes.  The 
major strategy employed was towards a moderate increase in employee cost sharing.  It 
was noted that unlike in the early 90's when many thought managed care would be a new 
panacea, employers generally failed to see any significant innovative approaches to 




A combination of variables was seen to be significant in Breaux, Duncan, Morris 
and Stanley's (2000) study of welfare benefits across the states.  Though the economic 
well being of a state was an important factor in the level of cash assistance provided, it 
was in combination with a state's political culture that the best explanation of the 
variation of benefit levels could be viewed.  The highest level of cash benefits were found 
in states that were both relatively wealthy and classified as moralistic while the lowest 




Grogan's study of the political and economic factors influencing state Medicaid 
policy (1994) highlighted the importance of interest groups in influencing decisions on 
distributive policies such as physician reimbursement rates.  In this research, benefit 
structures will be of high interest to government employees, but likely rather insignificant 
to the general citizenry.  Thus, they may be influenced in accordance with Grogan's 
pressure group model.  Though Grogan's research on distributive policies was developed 
in the context of Medicaid benefits, not employee benefits, the researcher contends that 
the model can be utilized to test other state policies. 
A potential source of pressure influencing benefit provisions could come from 
state employees' labor unions.  Thirty-seven percent of state and local government 
employees are members of a union as compared to eight percent of private sector 
employees (McDonnell, 2005).  Radcliff and Saiz (1998) analyzed the relationship 




organizations have a profound influence upon public policy.  In Hayes and Kearney's 
(2001, p. 592) survey of public service human resource mangers referenced earlier, they 
found union impact on pay and benefits to be of primary importance to the practice of 
personnel management within union settings in 1998.  The managers, however, did 
anticipate a decline in its relative priority by 2008 compared to other labor relations 
variables.  Freeman (1986), in a review of ten earlier studies, found that public sector 
unions had a significantly greater impact on raising fringe benefits as compared to wages.  
The author went on to argue that, "politicians with short time horizons should be 
especially willing to negotiate contracts promising future fringes" (p. 58).  This 
conclusion is supported by Moore’s (1991) and McKethan, Gitterman, Feezer, & 
Enthoven’s (2006) contention that unions, driven by the politics of public employment, 
may be more likely to press for benefit changes over pay increases to reduce the public 
visibility of the increases. 
Unions have the potential of reducing state human resource managements’ ability 
to negotiate favorable health insurance rates.  As Hurley, Felland, Gerland, and Pickreign 
(2006) have pointed out, the unions' collective bargaining agreements prohibit major 
benefit changes except at renegotiation.  The unions' ability to lock in benefits for 
extended periods of time reduces state governments' ability to renegotiate or change 
carriers when market conditions might indicate such action would be beneficial.  
Additionally, public employers frequently face multiple unions with staggered renewal 
dates, further limiting flexibility.  Watts, Christianson, Heineccius, and Trude (2003) 
further elaborated on the difficulties arising when unions representing different workers 




annual carrier contracts are the norm for Fortune 500 companies as opposed to 61% of 
state governments reporting contract periods of three or more years. 
In a study of factors that accounted for variations across the states in various 
elements of state employee compensation, Kearney (2003) found that the higher the 
percentage of state employees belonging to a union, the lower the family health insurance 
cost of the premium.  In fact, union density was the only statistically significant 
independent variable to impact family health insurance contributions.  In Buchmueller, 
Dinardo, and Valletta's (2002) study of the union impact on provision and coverage of 
health insurance in the private sector between 1983 and 1997, they found union's 
impacting the take-up rate for insurance packages across all sizes of firms.  They 
attributed this result to a likely increase in either the quality of the insurance or its cost to 
the employee. 
The American Federation of State and County Municipal Employees (n.d.), the 
nation's largest public service employees union, cited health care as one of but three 
targeted areas listed for legislative action in 2006.  In a resolution passed at their 2004 
international convention, AFSCME called for a national single payer health care plan 
citing, "The most persistent challenges in bargaining are health costs and the erosion of 
health benefits; workers pay 50 percent more in cost sharing than they did 3 years ago, 
and insurance premiums are rising at double-digit figures for the third year in a row."  
The largest union action in Minnesota's state government history occurred in 
2001.  According to Boulard (2004), 30,000 state government employees represented by 
two different unions went on strike for twenty-one weeks driven predominantly by the 




In 2003, the union contract was readily signed when it came up again for negotiations.  
The quick resolution was attributed to the success of a multi-tiered insurance program 
that had been initiated allowing employees to choose health care providers at different 
price levels with corresponding differences in premium levels. 
Political ideology, political culture, economic conditions, and the role of pressure 
groups will all be investigated to assess their potential impact on the variation between 
states' benefit structures. 
 
How might we best investigate the issue? 
 If political ideology is thought to be a variable influencing the differing employee 
health care benefit structures between state governments how might we define and 
measure that ideology?  Gerring has said, "Few concepts in the social science lexicon 
have occasioned so much discussion, so much disagreement, and so much self conscious 
discussion of the disagreement, as 'ideology" (1997, p. 957).  One possible methodology 
is a measurement tool designed by Berry, et al (1998) which incorporates such elements 
as the roll call voting scores of state congressional delegations, congressional election 
outcomes, the governor's party affiliation, the partisan split within state legislatures, and 
various assumptions pertaining to voters and state political elites.  This method appears to 
be an expansion of one used by Buchanan, Cappelleri & Ohsfeklt (1991) that utilized 
Americans for Democratic Action and AFL-CIO's Committee on Political Education 
ratings of members of each state's congressional delegation.  As further support for use of 
this methodology, Holbrook-Provow and Poe (1987) considered five means of measuring 




preferable in terms of practicality and ease-of-use.  Coffey (2005) finds favor in the Berry 
et.al. approach in terms of the ease of replicating the procedure, but criticizes the use of 
party as a proxy for the gubernatorial ideology.  Burden, Caldeira, and Groseclose (2000) 
contend that roll-call based measures are as effective as alternative means in measuring 
ideology.  Though they acknowledge that such measures can be influenced by the 
confounding effects of constituency and party, they maintain that these factors are 
overwhelmed by ideology.  In contrast, they cite difficulty with measurements that rely 
on content analysis of press reports to determine ideology.  The authors maintain that 
reporters, in a desire to focus on the unusual, tend to "exaggerate the conservative 
tendencies of southern Democrats" (p. 249) whereas ADA scores do not produce such a 
bias for southern Democrats and result in a high level of validity. 
In another approach, Wright, Erikson, and McIver (1985) rely upon public 
opinion surveys to determine state partisanship and ideological composition.  However, 
Brace, Arcenequx, Johnson, and Ulig (2004) in an assessment of the methodologies 
utilized by Berry, Ringquist, Fording, and Hanson (BRFH) versus Wright, Erikson, and 
McIver (WEM) see strengths in both.  Their preference is clearly with WEM, but they 
see merit in utilizing BRFH's approach to measure elite preferences.  For purposes of this 
research, it is the political elites that will formulate the policy decisions leading to the 
provision of health insurance benefits for state government employees. 
 Tools exist to measure differences in political ideology and economic conditions.  
Elazar (1966) classified each state into one of the three possible political cultures and 
information on public employee union membership across states is readily available.  




the structure of benefit packages and whether the presence of certain variables may be 





CHAPTER  III 
HYPOTHESES AND MEASUREMENT 
 
As stated earlier, the purpose of this research is, first, to understand the variations 
in health care benefits provided to state government employees across all fifty states and, 
second, to determine what factors might contribute to such differences.  
 
Hypotheses 
The following figure is a graphic representation of the hypotheses to be tested and 
the formula for specifying the dependent variable; the specific nature of the hypotheses 
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H1:  There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the level of a 
state's economic condition.   
H2: There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the level of 
union membership of a state's government employees.   
H3: There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the degree of 
liberalism attributed to the state. 
H4: Variations in the level of benefits are explained by a state's political culture; 
moralistic states are more likely than traditionalistic or individualistic states to be 
associated with a higher level of benefits. 
In each of the hypotheses, the level of benefits is the dependent variable 
determined by the independent variables of economic condition, size of union 
membership, degree of liberalism (political ideology), and moralistic political culture. 
The rationale behind the development of the formula created to measure the 
dependent variable, level of benefits, is provided in the measurement section below.  The 
hypotheses themselves evolved from a review of the literature.  Ample evidence exists to 
indicate that tight economic times, combined with rising benefit costs, lead state 
governments to modify their offerings (Roberts 2001, Holahan et al 2004, Maxwell, 
Temin & Petigara 2004).  Likewise, the literature supports unions’ ability to influence the 
provision of employee benefits while potentially impeding state governments’ ability to 
effectively negotiate favorable rates (Hayes & Kearney 2001, Freeman 1986, Hurley, 
Felland, Gerland & Pickreign 2006, Kearney 2003, Boulard 2004).  This hypothesis 
assumes that the upward pressure on the provision of health care benefits exceeds any 




ideology of elected officials has been shown to influence the development of public 
policy (Wright, Erikson & McIver 1989, Coggburn & Schneider 2003, Kingdon 2003) 
though the effect has not been studied in this particular context.  As to political culture, 
states categorized as moralistic have been shown to provide either higher state 
expenditures on health programs or in support of public employee wages and benefits 
(Fitzpatrick & Hero 1988, Sharkansky 1978, Miller 1991, Koven & Mausolff 2002). 
 
Measurement 
Prior to testing the individual hypotheses, it is necessary to establish the level of 
variation in health care insurance benefits provided to state government employees across 
the selected states.  The literature clearly establishes that the variation exists, so we need 
not hypothesize on its existence, but we need to understand the relative differences 
between the states to give meaning to the remainder of our research. 
How to measure the variation of benefits across the states and how to define a 
"level of benefits" presents a conundrum.  There is no established rating system.  An 
attempt to assess all benefits and compare the value of such possible benefits as two 
chiropractic manipulations per year to one well-baby check-up runs the risk of being 
unwieldy and potentially subjective.  A mere listing of benefits and count of services 
covered does little to inform us of the value of the insurance package to the employee.   
A rational approach to assessing the variation and the level of benefit is to 
evaluate certain economic variables associated with the health care insurance.  Though 
the total cost of the premium likely reflects both local health care costs and the 




assume that the major factor influencing the premium is the value of services covered.  
Dollars and cents should, if properly analyzed, be a surrogate for available care.   
Hypothetically, a formula that considered the total size of the monthly premium, 
the amounts paid by the employer and the employee, the amount of the deductible the 
employee is responsible for prior to first dollar coverage, applicable co-payments, and the 
per capita health care expenditure for all people (not just state government employees) in 
each state could produce a standardization for "level of benefits".  The per capita 
expenditure would help mitigate against variations in health care costs across states.  
Such a formula does not, however, exist and the appropriate weighting of factors in 
developing such a formula is unknown. 
A reasonable approach in measuring the level of benefits is to look at how much 
each state invests in its employees' health coverage (i.e. the state portion of the total 
monthly premium for each employee) and adjust that by some sort of per capita health 
care price index to allow for different prices for similar services across states.  The 
decision to utilize the state portion versus the total premium was based on the thought 
that how much the state actually invests, adjusted for differences in health care costs 
across states, reflects the relative generosity of one state versus another.  Therefore, I 
have operationalized the "level of benefits" as the state contribution to an employee's 
monthly health care premium for family coverage divided by the quotient of a state's per 
capita health care expenditure divided by the national per capita average health care 
expenditure.  This approach is imperfect, but will serve as a reasonable proxy.  Taking 
Mississippi as an example, the level of benefits would be computed as follows.  The 




would be divided by .958.  The divisor is the quotient resulting from dividing 
Mississippi’s per capita health care expenditure of $5,059 by the national per capita 
health care expenditure of $5,283.  The computation results in a level of benefit of 
$318.50.  Appendix Table A.3 provides a state-by-state listing of all elements used to 
compute each state’s level of benefits. 
One potentially confounding variable not included in the hypotheses is the 
relative health of the states' government employees.  Health status indicators do show that 
there are differences in the relative health of people across different states.  If a state's 
population is healthier than another is it because they are investing more money in health 
care and getting better outcomes or might it be attributable to lifestyle and environmental 
differences, which actually reduce the need for many health care expenditures?  The 
terms of that debate are beyond the scope of this research.  However, an assessment of 
various health status indicators is provided in a later section to enhance understanding of 
the context within which the research results exist, and a proxy indicator for the health of 
all state residents subsequently is included as a control variable. 
Related to the above potentially confounding variable is Gold and Ritchie's (1993) 
warning in observing their findings on a comparison of total fringe benefits between 
states.  The researchers point out that the state's out-of-pocket expenses might vary 
differently from the variation seen in the rankings of provided benefits.  For example, the 
age and family size of state employees will influence the actual costs incurred 
irrespective of the level of generosity assumed by the benefit package itself.  Other 




population ratio, local hospital capacity, and the disposition of states' residents to travel to 
other states for care (Martin, Whittle, Levit, Won, & Hinman, 2002). 
The next variable to be operationalized is the economic condition of the state.  
Various measures could be used to impart meaning and rank order this variable.  For our 
purposes, the states' median family income figure will be used.  The mean individual per 
capita income was considered.  It is the primary factor that the federal government 
utilizes in setting the state reimbursement rates for Medicaid insurance and therefore a 
seemingly suitable representation of economic conditions for this endeavor.  The 
decision, however, to utilize the median family income was determined to be somewhat 
more relevant.  The health insurance premiums included within the computation of the 
dependent variable are based upon family, not individual, premiums.  Additionally, 
utilizing a median versus a mean income will protect against extremes at either end of the 
income spectrum. 
Union membership will be defined as the percentage of each state's public 
employees who are union members.  It was hoped to limit that data specifically to 
employees of state government; however, that subset of information could not be 
determined and the entire set of a state’s public employees holding union membership is 
a reasonable surrogate.   
The next variable to be defined and measured is a state's political ideology.  The 
ideology will be measured on a continuum from liberal to conservative.  Previous 
researchers have developed varied methodologies to depict such ideologies.  Berry et al 
(1998) have designed what appears to be a strong model for assessing the relative 




underlying assumptions, report on tests of reliability, and show evidence of construct 
validity.  The model computes a weighted average of the ideology scores of the state's 
governor, Republican members of the state's two legislative bodies, and Democratic 
members of the state's two legislative bodies. 
Determining state legislators' ideology is problematic since ratings assumed to be 
reliable do not exist across all states.  Berry et al (1998) chose to utilize Americans for 
Democratic Action (ADA) and AFL-CIO Committee on Political Education (COPE) 
ratings for federal legislators and apply them to their party and legislative body 
counterparts on the state level; the governor's score was that of the estimated scores for 
the combined state legislators (house and senate) from the governor's party.  As stated 
earlier, Berry et al's rating scheme for federal legislators is consistent with earlier work 
by Buchanan, Cappelleri & Ohsfeldt (1991). 
Given the scores, weighted averages were applied to allow for differences in 
power.  The researchers assumed equal power between the governor and the legislative 
branch, and equal power between the two chambers of the legislature.  Further 
assumptions were made relative to the power equation for majority/minority status of the 
two dominant parties in each chamber. 
The last variable to be measured is political culture.  In describing the distribution 
of political cultures within the states, Elazar allowed for some intrastate variation; 
however, a dominant classification does exist for each of the states.  Since his initial 
publication, some researchers such as Sharkansky have taken the original three 
classifications and established a 9-point schema that allows for the presence of a 




classifications: moralistic, traditionalistic, and individualistic.  Given the limit of fifty 
observations, restricting the number of variables seems prudent.  
Having defined the terms of the dissertation research and the specified measures, 
we can now turn to the actual gathering and assessment of the data. 
 
Data collection and analysis 
Data collection and analysis for this project will focus on quantitative 
methodologies.  The four stated hypotheses will be subjected to quantitative analysis 
techniques.  
The National Conference of State Legislatures (n.d.) has compiled data on a 
"standard benefits package" for state government employees in all fifty states for family 
health care coverage through an HMO from 1999-2006.  The data was compiled by 
Workplace Economics, Washington D.C. and supplemented by state research and 
telephone interviews conducted by the National Conference of State Legislatures 
(NCSL).  The state contribution for family coverage for plan year 2006 listed in the 
NCSL compilation serves as the state contribution to the employee health care premium 
in the level of benefits formula.  The per capita health care expenditure figure for all 
people in each of the selected states, and for the country as a whole, was collected from 
data available on the Kaiser Foundation State Health Facts website (The Kaiser Family 
Foundation and Health Research and Education Trust, n.d.).  The data is from 2004, the 
last year for which the Centers for Medicaid and Medicare Services have released data. 
Next, the states’ median family income was collected from the U.S. Census 




previous to the health care insurance data.  Utilizing data from the previous year for the 
independent variables is based on the fact that policy decisions relative to a given year's 
employees' health insurance package would be made in the year preceding its availability.  
The Census Bureau derived its data from the Current Population Survey and applied an 
inflation-adjustment factor to the 2-year average median 2004-2005 income to reflect that 
income in 2006 dollars. 
The union membership data is based upon the percent of public employees 
holding union membership in 2005.  The data set was constructed by Hirsch & 
Macpherson (2008) and is based upon estimates derived from the Current Population 
Survey. 
The government political ideology rating was obtained from a website maintained 
by R. Fording (n.d.), a co-author of the Berry, et al (1998) study containing the chosen 
measurement tool discussed above.  The government ideology scores are computed on a 
scale of 1 to 100 with the most conservative states at the lowest range of the scale and the 
more liberal states at the higher end of the scale.  The data retrieved was for the year 
2005. 
The classification of each state's political subculture was based upon the primary 
categorization for each state stipulated by Elazar (1984).  Consideration was given to 
using the political culture scale developed by Sharkansky (1969) and expanded, to 
include Alaska and Hawaii by Koven and Mausolff (2002).  Though this scale is more 
refined, and addresses Elazar's observation of blended cultures within a state, given the 
small sample size of fifty states it was determined to be more prudent to adhere to the 




that it results in the culture classifications looking like a continuum.  As Wirt (1991) 
pointed out, Elazar saw them "more as sides of a triangle for which linear quantitative 
methods might be inapplicable" (p. 5).  Additionally, Clynch (1972) has questioned both 
Sharkansky's conclusions and vigor in the construct of the researcher's scale.   
Political culture was established as a dummy variable measured on whether the 
state was classified as having a moralistic political culture (coded as “1”) or as 
individualistic or traditionalistic in political culture (coded as “0”).  The coding scheme 
reflects the specification of the hypotheses that a higher level of benefits is more likely 
associated with moralistic states than with traditional or individualistic states.  This and 
the above information constitute the required elements of data collection. 
To understand the relative contribution of each of the independent variables 
(economic condition, size of union membership, political ideology, and political culture) 
in explaining the dependent variable (the level of benefits) multiple regression analysis 
was conducted.  Multiple regression allows us to see the independent effect of each of the 
independent variables on the level of benefits while controlling for the other variables in 
the equation.  One problem that could arise is that of multicollinearity; the independent 
variables in the model may be redundant in their impact upon the level of benefits.  
However, given that we are limited to a sample size of 50 and that theory supports the 
model as constructed and does not present a rationale for combining variables, it will 
simply be necessary to test for the possibility and specify the results.  In fact, Klingman 
and Lammers (1984, p. 603) saw a high correlation between states with a high moralistic 





If the research hypotheses are supported, a positive association should be found 
between the level of benefits and the state's economic condition (defined as the state’s 
median family income), level of union membership of the state's government employees, 
and the degree of liberalism attributed to the state.  Additionally, a variation should be 
seen between the level of benefits and the state's political culture with a greater likelihood 
of moralistic states to be associated with a higher level of benefits.  Though an 
association was anticipated to be shown within each of the hypotheses, the strength of the 
association and the relative contribution of each factor were unclear.  For any of the 
hypotheses to fail to show an association that, in and of itself, would be an interesting 




CHAPTER  IV 
DIMENSIONS OF VARIATIONS 
 
Health status and health care is not equal across states.  Before looking at the 
specific variables addressed by this dissertation, it is helpful to take a broad look at many 
of the underlying differences in health care and individual health standings between 
states.  This will provide an enhanced context for the research and the implications of its 
findings.  Variations in the quality and cost of health care as well as specific health status 
indicators all serve as underlying factors in the choice and price of health care plans for 
state governments.  Additionally, some understanding of the types of health plans 
available to state employees as well as the considerations of state human resource 
directors will further our understanding of the environment.  Finally, consideration 
should be paid to the possible relationship between choice of plans and a state’s 
“generosity”, be that the generosity of individual residents or as exhibited by 
government’s support of health care. 
 
Quality and cost 
Recently, Cantor, Belloff, Schoen, How and McCarty (2007) developed a report 
for the Commonwealth Fund Commission on a high performance health system.  The 
report focused on state-by-state variations in thirty-two indicators of five dimensions of 
 
health system performance: access; quality; potentially avoidable use of hospitals and 
cost of care; equity (how well a state met the health care needs of its most vulnerable, the 
uninsured and low-income); and the ability to live long and healthy lives (p. 5).  Key 
findings included (1) a wide variation of quality results across states, (2) recognition that 
leading states consistently outperformed lagging states, (3) a close association between 
better access and better quality, (4) analysis of state comparative data  indicating that 
high quality is not associated with higher costs, and (5) recognition of substantial room 
for improvement for all states.  Following, in FIGURE 4.1, is a chart indicating 












One example of the variation in quality of health care across states, as well as an 
indication of room for improvement, is the percentage of adults age fifty and older that 
receive recommended health screenings and preventive care.  The researchers found a 
range of results from 32.6% - 50.1% receiving screenings and care with a median for all 
states of 39.7%.  Though the researchers did not find a relationship between high cost and 
high quality, they did find a wide range in the average single premium per enrolled 
employees within private sector organizations offering health insurance.  The range for 
cost of care varied from $3,034 - $4,379 with a median of $3,706 (p.6). 
 In operationalizing their research, Cantor et al. chose to use Medicare annual costs 
per beneficiary as the surrogate for cost of care.  Other measures might not arrive at the 
same conclusion regarding the lack of relationship between high cost and high quality.  In 
fact, of the twelve states (Iowa, New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine, Rhode Island, 
Connecticut, Massachusetts, Wisconsin, South Dakota, Minnesota, Nebraska, Michigan 
and Montana) classified in the top quartile for quality, all but Michigan exceed the 
national average per capita health care spending for 2004 as reported by Martin et al. 
(2007) and derived from the National Health Expenditures Accounts.  Five of the twelve 
(Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont) exceed the national 
average by 15-27 %.  The range of personal health care spending per capita for all states 
in 2004 was $3,972 (Utah) to $6,683 (Massachusetts), with a U.S. average of $5,283.  
Differences in spending are frequently thought of as stemming from price 
differences.  However, in a study of Medicare spending, Fisher (2006) found the most 




hospital stays for seriously ill Medicare beneficiaries during their last six months of life, 
Fisher found: 
States in New England, the Midwest, the Mountain states and the Pacific 
Northwest had low rates compared to residents of Hawaii (16.4 days), 
New York (16.3 days) and New Jersey (15.2 days).  Residents of Utah 
(7.3 days) and Oregon (7.8 days) had rates less than half the average 
among residents of New York and Hawaii.  Utilization rates for other 
services, such as physician visits and the number of different physicians 
seen during the last six months of life, are highly correlated with hospital 
stays. (p.2) 
 
Health status indicators 
How best can we assess the level of health of residents of one state versus 
another?  Two organizations, the United Health Foundation and Morgan Quitno Press, 
publish annual rankings of the healthiest states.  United Health Foundation utilizes 
eighteen variables that characterize personal behaviors (e.g., prevalence of smoking), 
community environment (e.g. violent crime), public and health policies (e.g., lack of 
health insurance), health services (e.g., adequacy of prenatal care), and outcomes (e.g., 
premature death) in developing their rankings.  Morgan Quitno’s formula utilizes 
seventeen negative factors (e.g. smoking, obesity, teen births, lack of access to primary 
health care) and four positive factors (hospital beds, childhood immunization rates, adults 
who exercise regularly and safety belt usage).  The rankings from both organizations can 
be found in TABLE 4.1 on the following pages. 
 By averaging the rankings for the two scales, the top ten healthiest states are 
Minnesota, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Hawaii, Maine, Utah, 
Connecticut, Iowa, and Nebraska.  The ten least healthy states are Louisiana, Mississippi, 




Arkansas.  One notices the obvious concentration of “healthiest states” in the north and 
“least healthy” in the south.  Though not a hypothesis of this dissertation, these rankings 
could be compared with Elazar’s characterization of political culture within the states.  
The findings may prove of interest and stimulate subsequent research.  The inclusion of 
various factors driven or influenced by government policy and actions may lead to some 
relationship with Elazar’s classifications. 
 











Average of the 
two rankings 
Alabama 45 40 42.5 
Alaska 31 36 33.5 
Arizona 34 42 38 
Arkansas 46 37 41.5 
California 23 19 21 
Colorado 16 28 22 
Connecticut 5 13 9 
Delaware 30 39 34.5 
Florida 41 46 45 
Georgia 42 44 43 
Hawaii 4 9 6.5 
Idaho 19 24 21.5 
Illinois 25 32 28.5 
Indiana 33 33 33 
Iowa 11 7 9 
Kansas 17 10 13.5 
Kentucky 39 29 34 
Louisiana 50 50 50 
Maine 9 4 6.5 
Maryland 32 35 33.5 
Massachusetts 7 3 5 
Michigan 27 21 24 
Minnesota 1 2 1.5 
Mississippi 49 48 48.5 
















Average of the 
two rankings 
Montana 22 26 24 
Nebraska 12 6 9 
Nevada 38 47 42.5 
New Hampshire 3 5 4 
New Jersey 14 16 15 
New Mexico 40 49 44.5 
New York 29 27 28 
North Carolina 36 31 33.5 
North Dakota 8 12 10 
Ohio 25 20 22.5 
Oklahoma 44 41 42.5 
Oregon 19 17 18 
Pennsylvania 28 23 25.5 
Rhode Island 13 11 12 
South Carolina 48 45 46.5 
South Dakota 18 22 20 
Tennessee 47 38 42.5 
Texas 37 43 40 
Utah 6 8 7 
Vermont 2 1 1.5 
Virginia 21 18 19.5 
Washington 15 14 14.5 
West Virginia 43 25 34 
Wisconsin 10 15 12.5 
Wyoming 23 30 26.5 
Source: United Health Foundation, America’s Health Rankings, 2006 ed. Morgan Quitno Press, 




Though the United Health and Morgan Quitno (Morgan &Morgan) rankings are 
helpful in assessing the broad picture of the health of particular states, some factors in 
their equation are less meaningful when we are thinking about an employed population 
with access to employer provided health care.  A more limited set of factors might prove 




that seventy percent of the nation’s health care bill is attributable to chronic illness, risk 
factors for many chronic diseases such as obesity and smoking may help to inform us as 
to the health status variations of government employees in different states.  The rankings 
for both risk factors can be found in TABLE 4.2 on the following pages. 
Averaging the rankings for the two risk factors, the top ten healthiest states (defined 
as lowest average for obesity and smoking) would be Connecticut, Hawaii, Utah, 
Massachusetts, Vermont, California, Colorado, Montana, New Jersey, and Rhode Island.  
The ten least healthy states (defined as the highest average for obesity and smoking) 
would be West Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, Mississippi, Alabama, Indiana, 
Oklahoma, Arkansas, South Carolina, and Alaska.  Again, we see the concentration of 
















Average of the two 
rankings 
Alabama 3 7 5 
Alaska 16 5 10.5 
Arizona 42 30 36 
Arkansas 8 10 9 
California 36 49 42.5 
Colorado 50 35 42.5 
Connecticut 46 48 47 
Delaware 29 25 27 
Florida 34 19 26.5 
Georgia 14 17 15.5 
Hawaii 46 47 46.5 
Idaho 31 44 37.5 
Illinois 25 34 27.5 
Indiana 9 2 5.5 
Iowa 20 28 24 
Kansas 27 45 36 
Kentucky 7 1 4 
Louisiana 4 14 18 
Maine 33 23 28 
Maryland 25 40 37.5 
Massachusetts 49 42 45.1 
Michigan 9 18 13.5 
Minnesota 28 32 30 
Mississippi 1 8 4.5 
Missouri 12 11 11.5 
Montana 44 39 41.5 
Nebraska 18 22 20 
Nevada 37 12 24.5 
New Hampshire 38 29 33.5 
New Jersey 40 43 41.5 
New Mexico 41 20 30.5 
New York 38 27 32.5 
North Carolina 17 13 15 















Average of the 2 
rankings 
Ohio 15 16 15.5 
Oklahoma 9 6 7.5 
Oregon 30 41 35.5 
Pennsylvania 23 9 16 
Rhode Island 45 37 41 
South Carolina 5 15 10 
South Dakota 20 36 28 
Tennessee 5 3 4 
Texas 12 33 22.5 
Utah 43 50 46.5 
Vermont 48 38 43 
Virginia 23 26 24.5 
Washington 31 46 38.5 
West Virginia 2 4 3 
Wisconsin 22 24 23 
Wyoming 35 21 28 
*Trust for Americas rankings are based upon the most obese state being #1; any difference from Trust 
for America’s published health rankings is due to removal of the District of Columbia 
**Kaiser provided data on percentage of adults smoking; the data has been converted to rank order 
with the state with the highest percentage of smokers ranked as #1.  
 
Source:  Trust for America’s Health, F as in Fat: How Obesity Policies Are Failing In America 




 Interestingly, some of the “unhealthiest” states have begun to initiate changes in 
their health insurance plans to incent improved health habits of their employees.  
Alabama, one of the heaviest states in the nation, is initiating a plan to require a body 
mass index (BMI) screening of all employees.  Those found to be obese by the BMI 
measurement in concert with high cholesterol, blood pressure, or blood glucose levels 




increase of $25 in the employee portion of their health insurance premium (Fernandez, 
2008). 
 Smoking surcharges have been added to the premiums of Alabama state 
employees as well.  Other states that include smoking surcharges to their public 
employees include Kentucky, South Carolina, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, and South 
Dakota.  The monthly premium increases in these states range from $15 to $40 
(CNNMoney, 2008) 
 
Health plan choices and state generosity levels 
 
As we begin to look at and analyze the differences between state employee health 
insurance plans it is important to recognize that the environment is far from static.  
Driven primarily by growing costs, states are looking for new solutions and innovations 
for providing health benefits.  Silow-Carroll and Alteras (2007) have studied efforts 
initiated by the Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC), the Minnesota Smart 
Buy Alliance, and the Wisconsin Department of Employee Trust Funds in promoting 
value-driven health care for state government employees.  New purchasing strategies are 
utilized which increase the accountability of providers for both the quality and costs of 
service.  Additionally, employees are presented with economic choices structured to 
incent them to choose higher value providers and to engage in preventive health 
practices. 
 Minnesota’s Department of Employee Relations (DOER), responsible for state 
government employees’ health insurance purchases, has joined a coalition of other public 




Alliance represents about sixty percent of state residents allowing for considerable 
negotiating leverage.  As a result of incentive-based strategies and a disease management 
focus, DOER was able to hold premiums steady with no increase in 2006 and recognize a 
$20 million savings that was returned to state employees through a “premium holiday.” 
 Wisconsin’s Employee Trust Fund Pharmacy Benefit Manager receives a bonus if 
the state saves money.  That incentive combined with a three-tier evidence-based 
formulary and additional quality and efficiency methods have resulted in an estimated 
savings of $160 million across three years. 
 Massachusetts GIC, covering more than 285,000 state employees, retirees, and 
their dependents, requires their health plans to initiate tiered cost sharing plans.  Current 
designs include placing hospitals and group physician practices into tiers.  Within three 
years all plans will be required to place individual physicians into tiers.  One challenge in 
this approach is the frequent consumer assumption that higher priced providers are 
inherently better.  Tiering based on quality will likely go through a number of hurdles in 
both establishing “quality” and in gaining the desired consumer response. 
In a related attempt to control costs and increase quality, CalPers, the California 
Public Employees Retirement System, has initiated a plan that restricts HMO 
participating hospitals and medical groups to those that achieve required cost and quality 
improvements (McKethan et al., 2006).  Should a hospital or medical group be removed 
from the HMO, employees that choose to continue using these providers may do so by 





 Though such practices as tiered pricing and alternative plans may present some 
confusion, and certainly necessitate some investigation, studies (Davis, Collins, Schoen, 
& Morris, 1995; Ullman, Hill, Scheye, & Spoeri, 1997; Rice, Gabel, Levitt & Hawkins, 
2002) have shown that being offered a choice of plans has a strong correlation with 
employee satisfaction with their health care benefits.  Rice, et al., reporting on findings 
from a Kaiser Foundation study, found that seventy-two percent of governmental 
organizations, as compared to a national average of sixty percent, offered employees a 
choice in health care plans. 
 What type of health plans are currently offered by state governments?  In a 2005 
survey of state human resource directors, Reddick and Coggburn (2007) identified five 
primary types of health plan offerings: conventional, health maintenance organizations 
(HMO), preferred provider organizations (PPO), point-of-service (POS), and high 
deductible health plans (HDHP).  Conventional plans are the traditional fee-for-service 
plans that dominated the health insurance market place until escalating costs drove 
development of new and competing offerings.  HMOs restrict participants to a particular 
set of physicians and health care facilities.  PPOs incent plan members by offering lower 
deductibles and co-payments to utilize designated physicians and hospitals, but members 
are not restricted from using out-of-network providers. POS plans operate in a manner 
similar to an HMO; however, with the approval of their in-network plan primary care 
physician, members can seek care outside of the network at a lower reimbursement rate.  
HDHPs are characterized by lower premiums and higher deductibles and are generally 
associated with health savings accounts (HSA) allowing individuals to establish tax-




availability information obtained from the eighty percent of state human resource 
directors responding to Reddick and Coggburn’s survey. 
 














number of type  
plan offered by 
state 
governments 
Conventional 27.5 72.5 18.0 .8
HMO 73.7 26.3 39.0 3.1
PPO 87.5 12.5 56.6 1.8
POS 25.6 74.4 13.5 .6
HDHP 30.8 69.2 NA NA
Source: Reddick and Coggburn, 2007 (p.12) 
 
Reddick and Coggburn asked the human resources directors about the factors that 
influenced their choice of health plans for state employees.  The directors’ responses are 
provided in TABLE 4.4 below.  Interestingly, the majority of respondents cited union 
and/or collective bargaining as not too or not at all influential.  In fact, it was the lowest 
rated of the seven listed factors affecting choice.  This contrasts with Hayes and 
Kearney's (2001) survey of public service human resource mangers referenced in the 
literature review.  In those surveys, conducted in 1998, union impact on pay and benefits 
was found to be of primary importance to the practice of personnel management within 
union settings.  The disparity in results might be due to a possible decline in union 
influence and size of membership over time.  Perhaps union influence was stronger 
amongst the 20% non-respondents to Reddick and Coggburn’s study, thus masking the 
















Cost to state 
government 
80.0% 20.0% 0 0 0
Access to care (e.g., 
location, hours, 
breadth of network) 
69.2% 28.2% 0 2.6% 0
Cost to employee 65.0% 27.5% 2.5% 5.0% 0
Quality of physicians 
(e.g., the percentage 
board certified) 
47.4% 44.7% 5.3% 2.6% 0
Customer service 
and/or administration 
by the plan 
45.0% 52.5% 0 0 0
Accreditation status 
and rating 
30.8% 48.7% 17.9% 0 2.6%
Union and/or 
collective bargaining 
25.6% 12.8% 15.4% 46.2% 0
Source: Reddick and Coggburn, 2007 (p.15) 
 
 
If cost is in fact the largest factor influencing health plan choice, might different 
states respond differently to cost?  Might some states be more generous than others?  The 
Catalogue for Philanthropy (n.d.) publishes an annual generosity index based upon 
individual levels of giving compared to income.  The information comes from Internal 
Revenue Service personal income tax returns utilizing average adjusted gross income and 
average itemized charitable donations.  By comparing the rank orders of each state’s 
average adjusted gross income with its average itemized charitable deduction and rank 
ordering the differences between the two measurements, they arrive at a national ranking 
of generosity for the fifty states.  The results for 2005 (based upon 2003 IRS filings) are 
presented in TABLE 4.5 below. Having produced the index since 1997, the organization 




may not be ideal, it is the only data easily available on an annual basis that provides both 
income and charitable giving amounts.  Further, they contend that eighty percent of all 
personal giving is captured in itemized charitable deduction reporting.  Their findings 
indicate “that nationwide, giving is not consistently related to income; rather, giving is 
shaped more by cultures, which tend to be regional, and by religion (not politics)”.  Eight 

















Mississippi 50 6 44 1 
Arkansas 46 5 41 2 
South Dakota 44 9 35 3 
Oklahoma 42 8 34 4 
Tennessee 35 3 32 5 
Alabama 38 7 31 6 
Louisiana 43 12 31 7 
Utah 30 2 28 8 
South Carolina 39 13 26 9 
West Virginia 48 22 26 10 
Idaho 41 20 21 11 
Texas 22 4 18 12 
Nebraska 34 17 17 13 
North Dakota 45 29 16 14 
Wyoming 17 1 16 15 
North Carolina 28 16 12 16 
Kansas 27 15 12 17 
Florida 23 14 9 18 
Georgia 18 11 7 19 
Missouri 31 24 7 20 
Kentucky 40 33 7 21 
New Mexico 47 40 7 22 
Montana 49 45 4 23 
Indiana 29 31 -2 24 



















New York 5 10 -5 26 
Iowa 36 42 -6 27 
Nevada 13 21 -8 28 
Ohio 32 44 -12 29 
Maine 37 49 -12 30 
California 6 19 -13 31 
Maryland 4 18 -14 32 
Washington 11 25 -14 33 
Vermont 33 47 -14 34 
Oregon 26 41 -15 35 
Pennsylvania 19 34 -15 36 
Virginia 7 23 -16 37 
Arizona 21 37 -16 38 
Delaware 14 30 -16 39 
Illinois 9 26 -17 40 
Michigan 16 35 -19 41 
Hawaii 24 43 -19 42 
Colorado 10 32 -22 43 
Minnesota 12 36 -24 44 
Connecticut 1 27 -26 45 
Wisconsin 20 46 -26 46 
Rhode Island 15 50 -35 47 
New Jersey 2 38 -36 48 
Massachusetts 3 39 -36 49 
New Hampshire 8 48 -40 50 




If the Catalogue for Philanthropy’s assumption that generosity is driven by the 
culture of an area is valid, then perhaps individual generosity might translate to 
governmental generosity.  One feasible way of assessing a state government’s level of 
generosity relevant to health care is to look at the government’s total health care 
expenditures (employee health insurance, Medicaid, public health, community health 
centers, etc.) as a percent of the state’s gross state product (GSP).  Such a comparison can 
be found in TABLE 4.6 below.  In this comparison we see greater geographic dispersion 
than observed earlier.  Rather than a clustering of southern states in the top ranks of 
spending as a percent of GSP, the southern states are distributed throughout the list from 





TABLE 4.6   TOTAL STATE GOVERNMENT HEALTH EXPENDITURE AS 
PERCENT OF THE GROSS STATE PRODUCT, 2003 
 
Rank State State Government Health Spending as % GSP 
  United States 3.3% 
1 Mississippi 5.9% 
2 Maine 5.3% 
3 New York 5.3% 
4 West Virginia 4.9% 
5 Rhode Island 4.8% 
6 Hawaii 4.5% 
7 Louisiana 4.3% 
8 South Carolina 4.3% 
9 New Mexico 4.3% 
10 Pennsylvania 4.3% 
11 Vermont 4.1% 
12 Arkansas 4.1% 
13 Kentucky 4.0% 
14 Tennessee 4.0% 
15 Missouri 3.9% 
16 Alaska 3.9% 
17 Alabama 3.8% 
18 Montana 3.7% 
19 North Dakota 3.5% 
20 North Carolina 3.4% 
21 Georgia 3.4% 
22 Minnesota 3.3% 
23 Nebraska 3.3% 
24 Ohio 3.3% 
25 Oklahoma 3.3% 
 
 
TABLE 4.6 Continued 
 
Rank State State Government Health 
Spending as % GSP 
26 New Jersey 3.3% 
27 Wyoming 3.2% 
28 Washington 3.2% 
29 Maryland 3.2% 
30 Michigan 3.2% 
31 Oregon 3.2% 
32 Connecticut 3.1% 
33 Texas 3.1% 
34 Arizona 3.0% 
35 Kansas 3.0% 
36 Idaho 2.9% 
37 New Hampshire 2.8% 
38 South Dakota 2.8% 
39 Delaware 2.8% 
40 Florida 2.8% 
41 California 2.7% 
42 Wisconsin 2.7% 
43 Iowa 2.7% 
44 Massachusetts 2.6% 
45 Illinois 2.6% 
46 Indiana 2.5% 
47 Utah 2.0% 
48 Nevada 1.9% 
49 Virginia 1.8% 
50 Colorado 1.8% 
Notes:  Includes state-funded health care expenditures for Medicaid, the State Children’s Health Insurance 
Program, state employees'' health benefits, corrections, higher education, insurance and access 
expansion, public health-related expenditures, state facility-based services, and community-based 
services. Sources of state expenditures include general funds, other state funds, and federal funds. 
Percentage based upon the total state gross product as cited by the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
in June, 2003. 
 






Significant variation does exist across the states in the quality and cost of health 
care, in the health status of the residents of each state, and in the resources we seem 
willing to apply in support of health.  As we have seen, health system performance and 
the health status of individuals appear to favor the northern versus the southern states.  
This division is not, however, replicated when we look at the percent of the gross state 
product each state applies to governmental health expenditures.  No clear geographic 
pattern emerges from this measure and, interestingly, only two of the states in the top 
quartile of spending as a percentage of the GSP are classified as moralistic states. 
Variation likewise exists in the type of health plans offered to state workers, 
though preferred provider organizations (PPO) and health maintenance organizations 
(HMO) are offered by the greatest percentage of states.  With cost being cited as the most 
significant factor in a state’s choice of plans they do, however, appear to be attempting to 
provide a variety of options to employees.  Rather than limiting choice, attention is paid 
to incenting employees to choose plans and providers representing higher value.   
A backdrop of variety in plans, expenditures, health systems, and health outcomes 
exists across the country.  Next we will look at the results of the hypothesized 
associations between the level of health care benefits provided to state government 









First, let us look at the basic descriptive statistics associated with the variables of 
interest.  The dependent variable, level of benefit (defined as the state government’s 
contribution to an employee’s monthly family health care premium divided by the 
quotient of the state’s per capita health care expenditure divided by the national per capita 
health care expenditure), showed a wide range in the value of the benefit from a low of 
$318.50 in Mississippi to a high of $1834.47 in New Hampshire, with a mean value of 
$809.04 (see Appendix A).   
Wide fluctuations are seen in the range of many of the component elements of the 
level of benefit variable.   The annual state per capita health care expenditures ranged 
from $3,972 in Utah to Massachusetts’ $6,683; the national per capita expenditure was 
$5,283.  States varied in the proportion of the family’s total health care premium they 
funded, ranging from 38.1% (North Carolina) to 100% (New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
North Dakota, Oklahoma and Oregon); the mean proportion funded was 79.8%.  The 
actual dollar amount funded by the states of each family’s monthly premium averaged 




As to the independent variables, the state’s economic condition, measured as the 
median family income, ranged from $35,525 in Mississippi to $62,223 in New Jersey 
with a mean of $47,635 (see Appendix B). The percentage of public employees within a 
state holding union membership varied from a low of 7.4% in South Carolina to a high of 
68.9% in New York; the average union membership was 32.87% across all states (see 
Appendix C).  On a scale of 1-100 with 1 being the most conservative and 100 the most 
liberal of states, the government ideology variable ranged from 10.13 in Utah to 91.99 in 
New Mexico with the average score hovering toward the middle at 49.93 (see Appendix 
D).  Elazar distributed the classification of political cultures fairly equally across the 
states.  Seventeen states were classified as moralistic; the remaining thirty–three states 
were divided into seventeen individualistic and sixteen traditionalistic political cultures 
(see Appendix E). 
TABLE 5.1 below is a table of the descriptive statistics associated with the 






TABLE 5.1   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR VARIABLES OF INTEREST 
 


















$35,525 $62,223 $47,635 $7,081.73 50
Union 
membership  
7.4% 68.9% 32.87% 17.94% 50
Government 
ideology 
10.13 91.99 49.94 26.74 50
Moralistic 
political culture* 
0 1 .34 .479 50
*Political culture is a dummy variable measured on whether the state was classified as having a 
moralistic political culture (coded as “1”) or as individualistic or traditionalistic in political 
culture (coded as “0”). 
 
 
Appendices A-E provide the state by state values for each of the variables. 
 
Correlations 
Now, let us begin to look at the specific hypotheses of this dissertation.  H1 stated, 
“There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the level of a state’s 




positive association between the two variables that was statistically significant at the .01 
level.  A Pearson correlation of .353 was rendered as a measurement of the strength of the 
relationship between the level of benefits and the level of a state’s economic condition 
(measured as the state’s family median income).  Pearson’s correlation is a quantitative 
measure of the strength of the linear relationship between two variables.  As O’Sullivan, 
Rassel & Berner (2003) have stated, there is not a definitive answer to how large a 
correlation coefficient need be to merit attention.  Though values of .4 to .6 frequently 
seem quite strong in the social sciences, more modest results may well be worthy of 
investigation. 
As was explained in Chapter III, the median family income was selected as the 
measure for this variable due to its similarity with the personal per capita income measure 
used by the federal government in determining state Medicaid reimbursement rates.  An 
alternative measure, the state Gross Domestic Product (GDP) was also considered; 
however, analysis failed to indicate a statistically significant association between the 
dependent variable, level of benefit, and the state GDP measure.  Neither did it provide 
for a statistically significant model when later incorporated into the regression model. 
 Next, a positive association was shown in H2 which stated, “There is a positive 
association between the level of benefits and the level of union membership of a state’s 
government employees.”  A Pearson’s correlation of .317 was rendered from this 
bivariate correlation analysis.  The association was found to be statistically significant at 




 Analysis failed to establish a statistically significant measure of association for 
H3, “There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the degree of 
liberalism attributed to the states.” 
 Finally, H4, “Variations in the level of benefits are explained by a state’s political 
culture; moralistic states are more likely than traditionalistic or individualistic states to be 
associated with a higher level of benefits,” rendered a Pearson’s correlation of .259 and 
was found to be statistically significant at the .05 level. 
TABLE 5.2 below is a table of findings: 
 
TABLE 5.2   MEASURE OF ASSOCIATION TO THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
LEVEL OF BENEFITS 
 
Independent Variable Pearson’s correlation 
Significance (1-
tailed) N 
Median family income .353 .006 50
Union membership .317 .013 50
Government ideology  .091 .265 50
Moralistic political culture .259 .035 50
 
 
Given the results, we reject the null hypotheses for H1, H2 and H4 and have 
insufficient information to reject the null hypothesis for H3.  In other words, three of my 
four hypotheses receive evidential support.  Even for the fourth hypotheses, government 






 Having analyzed the relationship between the dependent variable and each of the 
independent variables in isolation, the next step is to look at the combined effect of the 
variables and perform multiple regression analysis.  This will enable us to determine if, 




The first model is structured upon the following formula: 
 Y= β0+ β1X1+ β2X2+ β3X3+ β4X4+ε 
Y represents the dependent variable, the level of benefits; β0 represents the intercept; β1 
through β4 represent the slopes of each of the independent variables; X1 represents the 
state’s median family income; X2 represents the percentage of union membership amongst 
a state’s public employees; X3 represents government ideology; X4 represents moralistic 
political culture; and ε represents the error variable. 
The model demonstrated that 18.7% (the unadjusted R2) of the variation in the 
level of benefits is explained by the independent variables specified in the model, but 
none of the independent variables were found to be statistically significant.  Median 
family income neared statistical significance at a p-value of .077 as did a moralistic 
political culture with a p-value of .067.  However, the model as a whole was valid as 
indicated by the F-test (F=2.583 and p-value = .050). 
If the regression coefficients that are not statistically significant are interpreted as 




corresponds to an expected $9 increase in the monthly level of benefits for a $1,000 
increase in median family income controlling for all other variables in the model.  
Further, for each percentage increase in a states’ union membership, there is a 
corresponding increase of $2.15 in the level of benefits, for each unit increase in the 
liberal ranking of a state there is a corresponding increase of $.04 in the state’s level of 
benefits, and states with a moralistic political culture have a level of benefit averaging 
$120.75 higher than non-moralistic states while controlling for all other variables in the 
model. 
Tests for multicollinearity were conducted to determine if any of the independent 
variables were redundant in their impact upon the dependent variable.  All tolerances 
were greater than .25 and all variance inflation factors (VIFs) were less than 4; therefore, 
according to Netter and Washerman (R. Travis, class communication, March 25, 2004), 
no significant multicollinearity was identified between the independent variables.  
Interestingly, however, when viewed separately from the dependent variable, there was a 
statistically significant correlation between union membership and government ideology 
and between union membership and median family income.  The results of that analysis 





TABLE 5.3   CORRELATIONS AMONGST INDEPENDENT VARIABLES 
 








Correlation 1 .590(**) .092 .112
  Sig. (1-tailed)  .000 .263 .220
  N 50 50 50 50
UnMem Pearson 
Correlation .590(**) 1 .378(**) .136
  Sig. (1-tailed) .000  .003 .174
  N 50 50 50 50
GovIdeol Pearson 
Correlation .092 .378(**) 1 .051
  Sig. (1-tailed) .263 .003   .362




Correlation .112 .136 .051 1
  Sig. (1-tailed) .220 .174 .362  
  N 50 50 50 50
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (1-tailed). 
 
 
A review of the standardized regression coefficients allows us to assess the 
relative importance of the four independent variables.  With a beta weight of .245, 
median family income is ranked as the most important variable in the model, followed by 
a moralistic political culture (.212), union membership (.142). and, finally, government 
ideology (.004).  However, since none of these four variables proved to be statistically 
significant in the model, the attribution may simply be an artifact of the sample.  Though, 
if viewed as population data, statistical significance is less critical.  Results of the model 




























.009 .007 .245 1.447 .077 .631 1.585 
Union 
membership 
2.150 2.766 .142 .777 .220 .543 1.842 
Government 
ideology 

















In order to detect possible outliers influencing the results, Cook’s D, studentized 
residuals and hat-values were assessed.  The studentized residual identifies extreme cases 
in the dependent variable based upon the difference in its observed versus predicted 
value.  Both New Hampshire and Oklahoma exceeded Fox’s (1991) recommended cutoff 
of ±2 standard deviations when assessing the studentized residual (New Hampshire 




the states, however, Oklahoma was not unusually high.  Additionally, the computed 
Cook’s D value for New Hampshire exceeded Chatterjee and Hadi’s (1988) suggested 
cutoff of Di>4/(n-k-1) by .27 (.27235 computed Cook’s D vs. suggested cutoff of .09).  
The Cook’s D measure assesses a combination of the dependent and independent 
variables.  Finally, the hat-value measure assesses values that have the largest impact 
based upon a combination of independent variable values.  New York and Utah both 
exceeded the suggested cutoff point (computed as .15998) associated with the hat values 
measurement; New York’s value was .18054 and Utah’s was .1641.  Though based on 
the combination of independent variable values, recall that New York had the highest 
percent union membership of the fifty states and Utah had the most conservative 
government ideology score of the fifty states. 
Atypical data can be problematic and consideration should be given to discarding 
unusually high or low values.  However, when the discrepant data-point is correct, as is 
the case with the above states, they may add value to our understanding.  Automatic 
deletion of outliers may not be appropriate.  In this instance an alternative model was 
analyzed without New Hampshire given that it was identified by two of the measurement 
tools.  The analysis was performed to assess if the deletion might provide greater insight 
by substantively changing results.  Following, in Table 5.5, is the result of that model as 



















Model 1 (all 50 
states) 
.187 .114 2.583 .050 Median family income 
(.077) 




Model 2 (without 
New Hampshire) 
.124 .044 1.553 .204 Median family income 
(.190) 




The dependent variable is the level of benefits 
 
 
Deletion of New Hampshire weakened the strength of the originally suggested 
model.  Given that the data are correct, and that there is no theoretical reason to delete a 






 Another scenario worthy of investigation was to delete individual independent 
variables from the regression.  As was indicated above, though no significant 
multicollinearity was detected, when viewed separately from the dependent variable, 
there was a statistically significant correlation between union membership and 
government ideology and between union membership and median family income.  
Therefore, each of those variables was separately deleted from Model 1.  Following is a 
table indicating the impact on Model 1 when separately deleting median family income, 
union membership and government ideology: 
 
TABLE 5.6   REMOVAL OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES, RESULTANT p-
VALUES (ONE-SIDED) 
 














Median family income .077 - .010 .072
Union membership .220 .024 - .194
Government ideology .489 .410 .356 -
Moralistic political 
culture .067 .057 .054 .060
R2 .187 .149 .176 .187



















Deleting factors simply did little to strengthen the originally hypothesized model.  
It did, however, in some instances, raise individual variables to the level of statistical 
significance.  Union membership becomes statistically significant with the deletion of 
median family income.  The median family income becomes statistically significant with 
the deletion of union membership.  The deletion of median family income and the 
deletion of union membership each result in a slight increase of the p-value associated 
with moralistic political culture, though not to the level of statistical significance.  The 
changes detected in the analyses in Table 5.6 do not, however, merit wavering from the 
original model.  The changes were small and the original hypotheses were theoretically 
sound. 
 The next scenario that was considered addressed differences in political culture.  
The reference culture throughout the analysis to this point had been a moralistic culture.  
Is there something to be learned by modifying the independent variable to establish either 
a traditionalistic or individualistic culture as the reference culture?  Was, perhaps, a 
combination of cultures informative?  As above, the analysis was conducted utilizing all 
fifty states as in Model 1.  Changing the reference culture to Individualistic minimally 
strengthened the model raising the adjusted R2 from .114 to .120 and remained 
statistically significant at the .05 level.  Within the individualistic model, the median 
family income variable rose to the level of statistical significance.  None of the other 




TABLE 5.7   MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS VARYING COMBINATIONS 
OF POLITICAL CULTURES AS REFERENCE CULTURE 
 





Significance of independent 
variables 
(one-sided) 




.187 .114 2.583 .050
Median family income 
(.077), Union membership 
(.220), Government 
ideology (.489), Moralistic 
(.067) 
Alternative 




.144 .068 1.887 .129
Median family income 









.191 .120 2.663 .045
Median family income 










.197 .106 2.160 .076
Median family income 
(.057), Union membership 
(.151), Government 









.197 .106 2.160 .076
Median family income 
(.057), Union membership 
(.151), Government 










.197 .106 2.160 .076
Median family income 











Again, it was determined to be inappropriate to change the model based upon 
these results.  The improvement shown by the individualistic model was minimal at best. 
 The concluding scenario, utilizing the hypothesized variables, allowed for the 
substitution of Elazar’s three classifications of political culture with Sharkansky’s nine-
point schema.  Sharkansky’s scale was based upon Elazar’s identification of secondary 
subcultures within a state.  Elazar was unable to identify the intrastate variations in 
Alaska and, therefore, Sharkansky did not include the state in his work.  Consequently, 
my analysis, utilizing the Sharkansky scale, did not incorporate Alaska.  This model did 
result in a slightly higher unadjusted R2 than the previously chosen model.  Utilizing the 
Sharkansky scale, 21.1% of the variation in the level of benefits could be explained by 
the independent variables in the model as opposed to 18.7% in the chosen model.  
However, the increase did not seem sufficiently large to justify substituting the scale 
since a state, Alaska, would have to be eliminated from the analysis.  As was true in the 
earlier model, none of the independent variables were statistically significant, though the 
model itself was significant at the .05 level. 
 The correlation analysis did show an increased strength of association between 
the dependent variable, level of benefits, and the independent variables when utilizing the 
Sharkansky scale.  As in the previous analysis, the association with government ideology 




TABLE 5.8   MEASURE OF ASSOCIATION TO THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, 
LEVEL OF BENEFITS, UTILIZING SHARKANSKY’S SCALE WITH 
THE ELIMINATION OF ALASKA 
 
Independent Variable Pearson’s correlation 
Significance (1-
tailed) N 
Median family income .385 .003 49
Union membership .333 .010 49
Government ideology  .073 .308 49
Sharkansky scale of 




By way of explanation, the negative correlation for Sharkansky’s scale of political 
culture with the level of benefits is due to reverse coding.  A moralistic culture is at the 
bottom of the nine-point scale.  The strength of the association is not affected since that is 
based upon the absolute value of the Pearson’s correlation. 
 
Control variables 
 Might other variables, beyond those specified in the hypotheses, influence the 
level of benefits and what might they be? Earlier, in Chapter IV, contributors to chronic 
illnesses such as obesity and smoking rates, as well as the general health status of the 
people within a state, were discussed and variances between states were identified; these 
might be relevant factors.  An association might exist between how well a state is 
perceived to perform an array of human resource management functions and the benefits 
provided to its employees.  The age of the state workforce might influence both the cost 




size, percentage of women in the state government workforce are additional factors that 
might impact the level of benefits.   
Health status indicators, government performance measures, and the age of the 
state government workforce were all selected to be used as control variables.  Though 
race, average family size, and percentage of women in the state government workforce 
were considered worthy of investigation, the data for these attributes could not be found 
on a state-by-state basis and, therefore, that analysis was not performed.   
Below is a description of how each of the new variables was measured, the 
descriptive statistics found to be associated with each, the correlation between the 
dependent variable and these newly established control variables, and, finally, the impact 
of adding these variables into the regression analysis. 
 
Measurement and descriptives 
 First let us look at a measure of health status that might be applied to the state 
government workers.  Information pertaining to the health of each state’s total population 
is available, though not solely for government employees.  Chapter IV argued that 
contributors to chronic illnesses might prove to be a more useful tool in assessing 
possible health status variations of government employees rather than the broader picture 
offered by the United Health Foundation and Morgan Quitno Press annual rankings of 
healthiest states.  The healthiest state rankings incorporate such items as percent of 
uninsured within a state, teen birth and high school graduation rates; these and other 
factors are less meaningful when thinking about an adult, employed population with 




contributors to chronic illness, operationalized as the average of the obesity and adult 
smoking rankings for each state, as a control variable and later substitute that variable 
with the healthiest state rankings to see if there was a different outcome based upon the 
selected measure.  In both instances the data utilized was from 2005 to remain consistent 
with the approach throughout this dissertation of utilizing data one year in advance of the 
data for the dependent variable, level of benefits, since the decisions leading to the level 
of benefits for a particular year would have been made in the previous year.  Tables with 
this data can be found in Appendix F (Tables F.1-F.4); the data provided in Chapter IV 
was from more current years. 
 The Government Performance Project (The Pew Center on the States, 2005) was 
referenced to ascertain a measure of human resources management performance across 
the states.  The project grades the states in overall performance and various components 
of management.  One of those components is “People”.  This assessment considers how 
well each of the states mange their employees.  The evaluation considers strategic 
workforce planning, hiring and retaining employees, training and development, and 
managing employee performance.  The “People” scores on the Government Performance 
Project for 2005 were selected as a control variable.  States were graded on a letter scale 
(A-D) which was converted to a numerical equivalent scale (4-1); the scores for each 
state can be viewed in Appendix F (Tables F.5 and F.6). 
 The average age of the state workforce was found for forty-one of the states in 
2002 (Carroll and Moss).  As stated earlier, an attempt has been made to utilize data for 
the independent and control variables from the year previous to the independent variable.  




relative variation between the states even if the actual average age might have changed in 
subsequent years.  Regrettably, having data for only forty-one states, necessitated 
eliminating Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, 
Tennessee, and West Virginia from this particular analysis (see Appendix Table F.7). 
 TABLE 5.9 below is a table of descriptive statistics associated with the control 
variables: 
 
TABLE 5.9   DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR CONTROL VARIABLES 
 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation N 
Average State Obesity 
and Smoking Rates 
Ranking*  
3 47 25.2200 13.50932 50
Average of the 
Healthiest States 
Rankings * 
1.5 49.5 25.48 14.33704 50
Government 
Performance Project – 
People Score  
1.33 4.0 2.64 .55057 50
Average Age of State 
Government Employees 41.5 48 44.2561 1.58458 41
The dependent variable is the level of benefits 
Note - *The average of the Healthiest States Rankings is reverse coded with lower numbers 
representing healthier states. 
 
 
West Virginia had the worst average of smoking and obesity rates and Hawaii had 
the best.  In terms of the healthiest state ranking, Louisiana and Mississippi were tied as 
the worst and New Hampshire and Vermont as the best.  Georgia garnered the best 
Government Performance “People” score and Wyoming and Rhode Island tied for the 








Having identified a set of control variables, bivariate correlation analysis was 
performed to ascertain their potential association with the dependent variable, level of 
benefits.  Neither the Government Performance Project “People” score nor the average 
age of state government employees were found to have a statistically significant 
association with the level of benefits.  It is feasible that had the average age for all fifty 
states, rather than just forty-one, been available a stronger relationship might have been 
identified. 
Surprisingly, the obesity and smoking rating also was not found to be statistically 
significant.  The healthiest state ranking was, however, statistically significant.  TABLE 





TABLE 5.10   MEASURE OF ASSOCIATION OF CONTROL VARIABLES TO THE 








Average State Obesity and 
Smoking Rates Ranking  
.214 .068 50
Average of the Healthiest 
States Rankings  
-.393 .002 50
Government Performance 
Project – People Score  
.037 .400 50





The negative correlation associated with the average of the healthiest states variable is 
due to reverse coding; the healthiest state in both the United Health Foundation and the 
Morgan Quitno Press rankings was ranked as number one and the least healthy state as 
number 50.  As can be seen in the above table, the correlation between the healthiest 
states ranking and the level of benefits is one that is generally considered quite strong in 




Finally, multiple regression analysis will enable us to determine if, and how 
much, the combination of the originally established dependent variables and the control 




Given that the Government Performance Project “People” score, the average age 
of state government employees, and the obesity and smoking rankings were not found to 
have a statistically significant association with the dependent variable they were not 
included in the model chosen for this regression.  Model 1C analyzed the combined affect 
of the hypothesized independent variables and the healthiest state rankings in predicting 
the value of the dependent variable.  The model was not found to be statistically 
significant; the results are shown in TABLE 5.11 below. 
 




















.192 .100 2.087 .085
 
 
Variation of the dependent variable 
 In Chapter III it was argued that in operationalizing the “level of benefits” an 
adjustment should be made for differences in health care costs across the states.  By so 
doing, it was contended that the measurement would better reflect the “relative” 
generosity of one state versus another.  What would happen, however, if we were to want 
to analyze the “absolute” generosity of one state versus another rather than the “relative” 




differences between the states in their economic conditions and ability to finance their 
operations.  Not to counter the original argument, but to provide an additional 
perspective, an analysis was conducted wherein the level of benefits was defined solely 
as the state government contribution to the family premium; no adjustments were made 
for differences between a state’s and the national per capita health care expenditure.  
Bivariate correlation analysis measuring the association of the newly defined dependent 
variable (state contribution to family premium) with the originally hypothesized 
independent variables (median family income, percent union membership, government 
ideology, and a moralistic political culture), as well as multiple regression to assess the 
combined effect of the variables, was performed.  The results are found in TABLE 5.12 
and 5.13 below: 
 
 
TABLE 5.12   MEASURE OF ASSOCIATION BETWEEN STATE CONTRIBUTION, 
AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE, AND THE INDEPENDENT 
VARIABLES 
 
Independent Variable Pearson’s correlation Significance (1-tailed) N 
Median family income .408 .002 50
Union membership .491 .000 50










As compared to the correlation results with the original dependent variable, the 
Pearson’s correlation for both median family income and union membership have 
increased and both variables remain statistically significant.  Government ideology 
continues to fail to achieve a level of statistical significance and a moralistic political 
culture no longer is seen as statistically significant.  The following table shows the results 
of the multiple regression analysis. 
 
 
TABLE 5.13   MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS UTILIZING STATE  
CONTRIBUTION AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
 










Constant 244.706 281.039 .871 .194
Median family 
income 
.007 .006 .178 1.119 .134
Union 
membership 
5.772 2.752 .360 2.097 .021
Government 
ideology 




82.976 76.792 .138 1.081 .143
R2 .282 
Adjusted R2 .218 





This model is stronger than the one originally stipulated.  Substituting the state 
contribution for the computed level of benefits results in a model that demonstrates 
28.2% (the unadjusted R2), rather than 18.7%, of the variation in the dependent variable 
is explained by the independent variables specified in the model.  Further, the percent of 
union membership rises to the level of statistical significance, whereas, in the original 
model, none of the independent variables were statistically significant. 
 When utilizing the state contribution to the family monthly health care insurance 
premium as the dependent variable, the model indicates that for each percentage increase 
in a state’s union membership, there is a corresponding increase of $5.77 in a state’s 
contribution to the monthly premium while controlling for all other variables in the 
model.  If the regression coefficients that are not statistically significant are interpreted as 
the population coefficients, then, any increase in a state’s median family income 
corresponds to an expected $7 increase in the level of benefits for a $1,000 increase in 
median family income controlling for all other variables in the model.  Further, for each 
unit increase in the liberal ranking of a state there is a corresponding increase of $.22 in 
the state’s level of benefits, and states with a moralistic political culture have a level of 
benefit averaging $82.97 a month higher than non-moralistic states while controlling for 
all other variables in the model. 
 Adding the control variables (either healthiest state ranking and the Government 
Performance Project [GPP] People rating or the obesity and smoking ranking and GPP 
People rating) to this model had minimal impact and the one statistically significant 





 An alternative variation of the dependent variable would be to substitute the 
actual percentage of the family premium paid by the state for the computed level of 
benefit.  This model was, however, minimally weaker than the model utilizing the actual 
state contribution. 





CHAPTER  VI 
DISCUSSION 
 
The literature provides sufficient information to assume an association between 
the level of health care benefits provided to state government employees and a state’s 
economic condition, level of union membership, degree of liberalism attributed to the 
state, and the likelihood that a state is considered to have a moralistic political culture.  
The goal of this dissertation has been to evaluate those assumptions and to consider the 
impact of these potentially contributing factors.  As the research advanced, additional 
control variables were considered as well as an alternative dependent variable.  The 
impact of those variables will be discussed in the latter part of this chapter; first will be a 
discussion of the research as originally envisioned. 
 
Hypotheses 
H1 stated, “There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the 
level of a state's economic condition”.  As expected, this was found to be statistically 
significant and, additionally, had the strongest relationship with the level of benefits of 
the four independent variables assessed by bivariate correlation.  The top quartile of 
states with the highest median family income had a computed level of benefit of 




quartile states.  Further, the top twenty-five percent of these states funded 83.2% of a 
family’s total monthly health care premium as compared to 73.7% of the total for the 
bottom quadrant of states.  Clearly a state’s economic condition, as measured by the 
median family income, positively impacts the level of benefits afforded to the state’s 
government employees.  Difficult economic times combined with rising health care costs 
will provide challenges for the designers of state health care workers’ benefit plans. 
H2 stated, “ There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the 
level of union membership of a state's government employees”  Like the first hypotheses, 
H2 was also found to be statistically significant and resulted in the second strongest 
relationship with the level of benefits of the four independent variables.  This is 
particularly interesting given Reddick and Coggburn’s (2007) finding, cited earlier that 
state human resource directors rank union and/or collective bargaining to be the lowest 
amongst seven possible factors affecting choice of a health care plan.  Various 
considerations could contribute to this difference.  Potentially, union impact on benefit 
levels has become so imbedded that it is simply considered part of the normative situation 
and not as likely to be cited by human resource personnel.  It is also possible that the 
difference is a reflection of measurement variances.  The unit of measure in this analysis 
was the percent of all public employees within a state.  It is feasible that the inclusion of 
non-state government employees (i.e. city and county employees) could have skewed 
results in this analysis. 
The top quartile of states with the highest percentage of union membership had a 
computed level of benefit of approximately $968 as compared to the approximate $718 




these states funded 89.1% of a family’s total monthly health care premium as compared 
to 71.9% of the total for the bottom quadrant of states.  The percent of union membership 
of public employees within a state has an obvious and substantive impact on the level of 
benefits afforded to the states’ government employees. 
H3 stated, “There is a positive association between the level of benefits and the 
degree of liberalism attributed to the state.”  This association did not prove to be 
statistically significant.  In measuring this variable it was decided that the ideology of the 
state government, versus that of its general citizenry, would be utilized since the level of 
benefits was an issue determined by political elites and, though of interest to public 
employees, do not usually rise to the level of attention of the broader public.   
However, Erikson, Wright, & McIver (1989) did find that the ideology of a state 
legislature was tempered by state public opinion and so it seemed prudent to investigate 
the possibility of the citizens’ ideology having an impact.  The original decision was, in 
fact, valid in that a measure of citizens’ ideology likewise did not prove to be statistically 
significant (p-value of .415).  The measure, developed by Berry et al (1998), utilizes 
election results by congressional district within each state.  An ideology score, based 
upon ADA and COPE ratings, is assigned to each congressional incumbent and an 
estimated score is developed for each challenger.  The estimated score is derived from the 
average ideology score of all incumbents in the state from the challenger’s party.  By 
including an ideology score for the loser as well as the winner, the resulting score 
incorporates a more inclusive picture of the broader voting population’s ideological bent.  
To further assess any possible citizen ideology impact, a bivariate correlation between the 




Utilizing the percentage of votes for John Kerry in each of the states as the ideology 
measure no statistically significant association was found with the level of benefits (p- 
value of .101). 
We can, therefore, conclude that the level of benefits does not appear to be 
sensitive to the degree of liberalism present within a state, whether the ideology is 
measured as that of the political elite (i.e. government ideology) or that of the broader 
population (i.e. citizen ideology).  This finding, in combination with the finding for H1, 
resonates with the related conclusions cited earlier of Buchanan, Cappelleri and Ohsfeklt 
(1991) that economic conditions rather than political ideology had a significant impact on 
state Medicaid spending levels.  Both findings impact the availability of health care 
benefits for citizens, albeit in different circumstances.  Though Medicaid is a 
redistributive policy, support of benefits for government employees is a distributive 
policy.  Is it likely that distributive policies are even less sensitive to ideological 
differences? 
H4 stated that, “Variations in the level of benefits are explained by a state's 
political culture; moralistic states are more likely than traditionalistic or individualistic 
states to be associated with a higher level of benefits.”  This variable, like median family 
income and union membership, was found to be statistically significant.  Moralistic states 
had a computed level of benefit of approximately $906 as compared to the approximate 
$759 level of benefit for all other states ($814 for individualistic, $701 for 
traditionalistic).  Further, the moralistic states funded 84.1% of a family’s total monthly 
health care premium as compared to 77.6% of the total for the remaining states (83.3% 




Political culture might be thought of as a predisposition towards action or non-
action with moralistic states predisposed to act for improvement of social and economic 
conditions.  Support for government employee health care benefits would, as shown, be 
more likely in such a climate than in a traditionalistic state that is predisposed to maintain 
the status quo in support of the existing social order or in an individualistic state 
predisposed towards actions favoring private initiatives.  As changes occur in the 
structure of health care benefit offerings it will be interesting to see if individualistic 
states are more inclined to support health savings accounts.  Approaches taken by 
moralistic states will also likely be of interest; Elazar (1984, p.167), utilizing data 
developed by Walker, saw moralistic states as leaders in program innovation. 
 
Multiple regression models 
Regression is a valuable tool that can provide an increased explanatory value to 
the analysis of the impact of multiple independent variables.  The primary model chosen 
for analysis incorporated all fifty states and all four independent variables.  The results of 
that analysis indicated a statistically significant model; however, none of the four 
variables was found to be significant. 
The p-value for any one variable is based upon the unique contribution of that 
variable above the contribution of the other variables.  Given that union membership was 
found to be correlated with median family income, as well as with government ideology, 
these variables carry some of the same information and their strength is, therefore, 
reduced when viewed in the context of the multiple regression model.  In fact, when 




statistical significance and, likewise, when union membership was removed from the 
model, median family income rose to the level of statistical significance. 
Considering the presence of all the variables in the real world environment, the 
size of the median family income will likely exert the greatest upward pressure on the 
level of benefit.  However, the independent significance of both the proportion of union 
members within the ranks of public employees and a moralistic political culture will 
impact the level of benefit as well.  
Change is coming to the health care insurance marketplace be it though price or 
through structural modifications.  That change will impact decisions made by state 
governments relative to the benefits provided to their employees and their families.  The 
economic condition of the state will influence and, in some instances, dictate the 
direction taken by the individual states.  Government workers in states with a large 
percentage of union members may well benefit from the pressure exerted by the unions to 
address the health care needs of their members.  Response to the dynamics of the health 
insurance marketplace will be tempered by the political culture of the states.  The 
predisposition of the moralistic states to promote the public good is likely to translate to 
enhanced benefits for those government employees as compared to those in other states. 
Having completed the research originally specified by this dissertation, the next 
question is “What else?”  What else contributes to the level of benefits?  Though a 
statistically significant model, it was moderately weak.  As shown in the results chapter, 
the addition of the healthiest state ranking, as a control variable, resulted in a model that 
was not statistically significant.  However, the healthiest state ranking had the highest 




The quartile of states with the healthiest state rankings had a computed level of 
benefit of approximately $967 as compared to the approximate $699 level of benefit for 
the least healthy quartile of states.  Further, the top twenty-five percent of these states 
funded 85.6% of a family’s total health care premium as compared to 71.7% of the total 
for the bottom quadrant of states.  The health ranking of a state has an obvious and 
substantive association with the level of benefits afforded to the states’ government 
employees.  But what drives the association?  Do healthier states simply spend more on 
health care benefits or do the greater benefits create a healthier state?  One could 
logically look at this from both directions.  In a healthier state perhaps there is a greater 
value placed on health care that increases the likelihood of providing greater benefits; 
likewise, providing increased benefits may result in increased, and perhaps improved, 
health care leading to improved health outcomes and an increase in the state’s ranking. 
Much has been learned from the models studied, but what else might affect the 
level of benefits?  Are there a multitude of factors, each smaller in its impact than those 
already identified, or are there one or more dominant factors to be considered?  
Identification and assessment of additional possibly contributing factors is a worthy 
pursuit. 
In a white paper prepared for the National Association of State Personnel 
Executives (2006), a number of potentially contributing factors influencing the cost of 
health care benefits between state governments and large private employers were 
discussed.  These factors may well play a role in the differing level of benefits between 
the states as well.  Some factors considered were age of the workforce, geographic 




plans.  The “level of benefit” may not be a reflection of broader coverage, but of higher 
premium costs brought on by one or more of these factors.  Does State A have an older 
workforce than State B?  Does State C have more employees located in rural areas with 
an associated increased cost structure for health care than the employees of State D?  Has 
State E placed non-state employees under the umbrella of their employee health plan and 
adversely affected the size of their risk as compared to State F?  Does State G offer a 
broader array of health plan options to their employees than that offered by State H and 
does that increased offering reduce their purchasing power with a single vendor and 
increase their administrative costs?   
Additional research opportunities exist to further ascertain the factors contributing 
to the variation in the level of health care benefits to state government employees across 
the country.  Future research may refine and redefine “level of benefits”.  As was shown 
in this research, a different perspective on measuring benefits affected the outcome and 
strengthened the model.  What is important in viewing the results of this dissertation 
research is to accept them as a starting point.  As was pointed out in both the Introduction 
and the Review of the Literature, a scant amount of research exists on this topic.  A base 
line of information has been developed that will, hopefully stimulate additional 




CHAPTER  VII 
CONCLUSION 
 
In Mississippi, the family of a state government employee pays an in network 
deductible of $1,000 prior to the first dollar of health care insurance coverage.  For some 
families the amount of the deductible can be a substantial barrier to accessing care.  
Understanding the variations between states and the factors that lead to those variations 
can ultimately lead to a healthier society if we appropriately make use of findings.  
Knowing that there is a relationship between the overall health of the state and the level 
of benefits afforded its government workers allows advocates of increased benefits to 
place their requests in a broader context.   Having found that states with a moralistic 
political culture are more likely than individualistic or traditionalistic states to provide a 
higher level of health care benefits for their employees will not enable a state to change 
its' political culture.  However, having recognized one aspect that affects the availability 
of benefits, recommendations may be developed and advocated for in a manner more 
resonant with the prevailing culture.  Likewise, adaptations may be made in greater 
recognition of a state's economic condition or union membership if needed. 
The health of a state's employees likely impacts their productivity; the availability 
of benefits, as found by Light (1999) and others, impacts motivation.  The quality of 




but also in terms of their employee base.  Understanding differences between states and 
the factors that drive those differences has the potential of improving lives and the 
functioning of state governments. 
The practical considerations made this an important research endeavor, but what of its 
contribution to theory?  At the end of the day, how is the body of knowledge in the field 
of public policy and administration advanced by this inquiry?  The dissertation is Stage 1, 
it has uncovered some of the differences and the factors influencing those differences, it 
has done that in recognition that those differences have a potential impact on the ability 
of state government to attract and maintain employees of merit.  Stage 1 has not directly 
assessed the effect of that potential impact, but it can provide the way for further study.  
It suggests that future endeavors consider the following: 
 
 If the theory of inequity allows for assessment by an internal standard that is 
influenced by perceived market values, might a sense of inequity arise when an 
employee in State A believes his or her coverage is significantly less than that 
available to employees in State B? 
 
 If the theory of inequity allows for assessment by an internal standard that is 
influenced by historical knowledge, might a sense of inequity arise as benefits are 





 In attempting to either achieve equity, or reduce inequity, might an individual 
adopt strategies of giving "voice" to their dissatisfaction in hopes of reducing the 
inequity, "neglect" parts of their job, or "exit" to reduce the inequity? 
 
Stage 1 was, however, significant in and of itself.  In a country that spends $2.1 
trillion a year, 16% of its gross domestic product, on health care and debates whether 
we should continue with a host of different plans, provide coverage for some and not 
for others, or move to a national plan that might be a single plan or allow for optional 
public and private plans while incorporating the principal of universal coverage, this 
research allows us to look at how and why states vary in their treatment and delivery 
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TABLE A.1   LEVEL OF BENEFIT BY STATE, 2006 ALPHABETICAL 
 
State Level of Benefit State Level of Benefit 
Alabama $668.73 Montana $526.22
Alaska $624.95 Nebraska $1,077.21
Arizona $1,053.92 Nevada $782.30
Arkansas $568.00 New Hampshire $1,834.47
California $919.23 New Jersey $760.35
Colorado $515.49 New Mexico $650.92
Connecticut $828.91 New York $671.19
Delaware $882.61 North Carolina $326.83
Florida $689.81 North Dakota $503.87
Georgia $674.41 Ohio $787.36
Hawaii $521.11 Oklahoma $1,179.92
Idaho $685.55 Oregon $1,085.80
Illinois $1,094.45 Pennsylvania $530.55
Indiana $915.50 Rhode Island $936.67
Iowa $971.91 South Carolina $546.48
Kansas $593.18 South Dakota $411.93
Kentucky $678.95 Tennessee $856.26
Louisiana $677.04 Texas $770.55
Maine $902.67 Utah $1,174.04
Maryland $656.35 Vermont $1,045.07
Massachusetts $917.11 Virginia $973.99
Michigan $1,240.08 Washington $988.75
Minnesota $890.53 West Virginia $575.86
Mississippi $318.50 Wisconsin $1,118.51





TABLE A.2   LEVEL OF BENEFIT BY STATE, 2006 RANK ORDERED 
 
State Level of Benefit State Level of Benefit 
New Hampshire $1,834.47 Nevada $782.30
Michigan $1,240.08 Texas $770.55
Oklahoma $1,179.92 New Jersey $760.35
Utah $1,174.04 Florida $689.81
Wisconsin $1,118.51 Idaho $685.55
Illinois $1,094.45 Kentucky $678.95
Oregon $1,085.80 Louisiana $677.04
Nebraska $1,077.21 Georgia $674.41
Arizona $1,053.92 New York $671.19
Vermont $1,045.07 Alabama $668.73
Washington $988.75 Maryland $656.35
Virginia $973.99 New Mexico $650.92
Iowa $971.91 Alaska $624.95
Missouri $948.11 Kansas $593.18
Rhode Island $936.67 West Virginia $575.86
California $919.23 Arkansas $568.00
Massachusetts $917.11 South Carolina $546.48
Indiana $915.50 Pennsylvania $530.55
Maine $902.67 Montana $526.22
Wyoming $900.18 Hawaii $521.11
Minnesota $890.53 Colorado $515.49
Delaware $882.61 North Dakota $503.87
Tennessee $856.26 South Dakota $411.93
Connecticut $828.91 North Carolina $326.83


































Alabama        $650 $5,135 $5,283 0.972 $668.73 
Alaska         $763 $6,450 $5,283 1.221 $624.95 
Arizona        $819 $4,103 $5,283 0.777 $1,053.92 
Arkansas       $523 $4,863 $5,283 0.920 $568.00 
California     $807 $4,638 $5,283 0.878 $919.23 
Colorado       $460 $4,717 $5,283 0.893 $515.49 
Connecticut    $995 $6,344 $5,283 1.201 $828.91 
Delaware       $1054 $6,306 $5,283 1.194 $882.61 
Florida        $716 $5,483 $5,283 1.038 $689.81 
Georgia        $587 $4,600 $5,283 0.871 $674.41 
Hawaii         $487 $4,941 $5,283 0.935 $521.11 
Idaho          $577 $4,444 $5,283 0.841 $685.55 
Illinois       $1097 $5,293 $5,283 1.002 $1,094.45 
Indiana        $918 $5,295 $5,283 1.002 $915.50 
Iowa           $990 $5,380 $5,283 1.018 $971.91 
Kansas         $604 $5,382 $5,283 1.019 $593.18 
Kentucky       $703 $5,473 $5,283 1.036 $678.95 
Louisiana      $646 $5,040 $5,283 0.954 $677.04 
Maine          $1117 $6,540 $5,283 1.238 $902.67 
Maryland       $694 $5,590 $5,283 1.058 $656.35 
Massachusetts  $1160 $6,683 $5,283 1.265 $917.11 
Michigan       $1187 $5,058 $5,283 0.957 $1,240.08 
Minnesota      $977 $5,795 $5,283 1.097 $890.53 
Mississippi    $305 $5,059 $5,283 0.958 $318.50 
Missouri       $977 $5,444 $5,283 1.030 $948.11 


































Nebraska       $1142 $5,599 $5,283 1.060 $1,077.21 
Nevada         $677 $4,569 $5,283 0.865 $782.30 
New 
Hampshire  $1886 $5,432 $5,283 1.028 $1,834.47 
New Jersey     $836 $5,807 $5,283 1.099 $760.35 
New Mexico     $551 $4,471 $5,283 0.846 $650.92 
New York       $830 $6,535 $5,283 1.237 $671.19 
North Carolina $321 $5,191 $5,283 0.983 $326.83 
North Dakota   $554 $5,808 $5,283 1.099 $503.87 
Ohio           $853 $5,725 $5,283 1.084 $787.36 
Oklahoma       $1098 $4,917 $5,283 0.931 $1,179.92 
Oregon         $1003 $4,880 $5,283 0.924 $1,085.80 
Pennsylvania   $596 $5,933 $5,283 1.123 $530.55 
Rhode Island   $1098 $6,193 $5,283 1.172 $936.67 
South Carolina $529 $5,114 $5,283 0.968 $546.48 
South Dakota   $415 $5,327 $5,283 1.008 $411.93 
Tennessee      $886 $5,464 $5,283 1.034 $856.26 
Texas          $671 $4,601 $5,283 0.871 $770.55 
Utah           $883 $3,972 $5,283 0.752 $1,174.04 
Vermont        $1201 $6,069 $5,283 1.149 $1,045.07 
Virginia       $889 $4,822 $5,283 0.913 $973.99 
Washington     $953 $5,092 $5,283 0.964 $988.75 
West Virginia  $649 $5,954 $5,283 1.127 $575.86 
Wisconsin      $1200 $5,670 $5,283 1.073 $1,118.51 











TABLE B.1   MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY STATE, 2004-05 ALPHABETICAL 
 
State Median Family Income State 
Median Family 
Income 
Alabama $38,733 Montana $37,391
Alaska $58,249 Nebraska $48,116
Arizona $46,765 Nevada $50,088
Arkansas $37,601 New Hampshire $59,749
California $52,996 New Jersey $62,223
Colorado $53,210 New Mexico $41,226
Connecticut $58,756 New York $48,191
Delaware $52,101 North Carolina $43,193
Florida $43,834 North Dakota $42,720
Georgia $45,589 Ohio $45,805
Hawaii $60,787 Oklahoma $40,582
Idaho $46,486 Oregon $44,682
Illinois $49,584 Pennsylvania $47,449
Indiana $44,505 Rhode Island $51,136
Iowa $47,170 South Carolina $41,424
Kansas $43,620 South Dakota $44,222
Kentucky $37,956 Tennessee $40,668
Louisiana $38,671 Texas $43,484
Maine $44,739 Utah $55,455
Maryland $61,724 Vermont $51,443
Massachusetts $56,690 Virginia $54,102
Michigan $46,272 Washington $52,797
Minnesota $57,939 West Virginia $36,631
Mississippi $35,525 Wisconsin $47,464
Missouri $44,686 Wyoming $47,321





TABLE B.2   MEDIAN FAMILY INCOME BY STATE, 2004-05 RANK ORDERED 
 
State Median Family Income State 
Median Family 
Income 
New Jersey $62,223 Idaho $46,486
Maryland $61,724 Michigan $46,272
Hawaii $60,787 Ohio $45,805
New Hampshire $59,749 Georgia $45,589
Connecticut $58,756 Maine $44,739
Alaska $58,249 Missouri $44,686
Minnesota $57,939 Oregon $44,682
Massachusetts $56,690 Indiana $44,505
Utah $55,455 South Dakota $44,222
Virginia $54,102 Florida $43,834
Colorado $53,210 Kansas $43,620
California $52,996 Texas $43,484
Washington $52,797 North Carolina $43,193
Delaware $52,101 North Dakota $42,720
Vermont $51,443 South Carolina $41,424
Rhode Island $51,136 New Mexico $41,226
Nevada $50,088 Tennessee $40,668
Illinois $49,584 Oklahoma $40,582
New York $48,191 Alabama $38,733
Nebraska $48,116 Louisiana $38,671
Wisconsin $47,464 Kentucky $37,956
Pennsylvania $47,449 Arkansas $37,601
Wyoming $47,321 Montana $37,391
Iowa $47,170 West Virginia $36,631
Arizona $46,765 Mississippi $35,525











TABLE C.1   PERCENT UNION MEMBERSHIP OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES BY 
STATE, 2005 ALPHABETICAL 
 
State Union Membership State 
Union 
Membership 
Alabama 30.9 Montana 28.6
Alaska 48.5 Nebraska 26.9
Arizona 18.1 Nevada 28.2
Arkansas 12.9 New Hampshire 49.9
California 53.8 New Jersey 64.1
Colorado 23.8 New Mexico 21.6
Connecticut 63.5 New York 68.9
Delaware 38.4 North Carolina 8.7
Florida 22.3 North Dakota 20.7
Georgia 12.1 Ohio 46.0
Hawaii 57.7 Oklahoma 15.5
Idaho 14.2 Oregon 48.9
Illinois 48.5 Pennsylvania 48.5
Indiana 28.2 Rhode Island 63.6
Iowa 32.8 South Carolina 7.4
Kansas 14.8 South Dakota 19.9
Kentucky 18.6 Tennessee 17.1
Louisiana 14.0 Texas 16.8
Maine 42.8 Utah 15.7
Maryland 32.3 Vermont 38.5
Massachusetts 58.3 Virginia 10.4
Michigan 58.0 Washington 51.4
Minnesota 52.6 West Virginia 28.3
Mississippi 14.6 Wisconsin 49.5
Missouri 21.4 Wyoming 15.3




TABLE C.2   PERCENT UNION MEMBERSHIP OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES BY 
STATE, 2005 RANK ORDERED 
 
State Union Membership State 
Union 
Membership 
New York 68.9 Indiana 28.2
New Jersey 64.1 Nevada 28.2
Rhode Island 63.6 Nebraska 26.9
Connecticut 63.5 Colorado 23.8
Massachusetts 58.3 Florida 22.3
Michigan 58.0 New Mexico 21.6
Hawaii 57.7 Missouri 21.4
California 53.8 North Dakota 20.7
Minnesota 52.6 South Dakota 19.9
Washington 51.4 Kentucky 18.6
New Hampshire 49.9 Arizona 18.1
Wisconsin 49.5 Tennessee 17.1
Oregon 48.9 Texas 16.8
Alaska 48.5 Utah 15.7
Illinois 48.5 Oklahoma 15.5
Pennsylvania 48.5 Wyoming 15.3
Ohio 46.0 Kansas 14.8
Maine 42.8 Mississippi 14.6
Vermont 38.5 Idaho 14.2
Delaware 38.4 Louisiana 14.0
Iowa 32.8 Arkansas 12.9
Maryland 32.3 Georgia 12.1
Alabama 30.9 Virginia 10.4
Montana 28.6 North Carolina 8.7
West Virginia 28.3 South Carolina 7.4












TABLE D.1   GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY SCORE BY STATE, 2005 
ALPHABETICAL 
 
State Government Ideology State 
Government 
Ideology 
Alabama 42.625 Montana 73.14538
Alaska 13.16667 Nebraska 16.875
Arizona 52.875 Nevada 37.12738
Arkansas 43.75 New Hampshire 46.2595
California 49.59286 New Jersey 88.51563
Colorado 37.31163 New Mexico 91.99048
Connecticut 69.58334 New York 41.10945
Delaware 72.5625 North Carolina 84.37583
Florida 10.3421 North Dakota 20.14565
Georgia 14.18442 Ohio 16.57121
Hawaii 68.84393 Oklahoma 44.36544
Idaho 20 Oregon 79.35
Illinois 85.06613 Pennsylvania 60.11131
Indiana 18.335 Rhode Island 77.83333
Iowa 68.91275 South Carolina 14.15885
Kansas 45 South Dakota 15.5
Kentucky 27.02015 Tennessee 60.56313
Louisiana 88.66666 Texas 10.8615
Maine 88.59511 Utah 10.125
Maryland 55.53125 Vermont 89.4243
Massachusetts 68.40019 Virginia 53.00834
Michigan 62.27471 Washington 82.48286
Minnesota 38.77166 West Virginia 89.75
Mississippi 40.37788 Wisconsin 54.11048
Missouri 11.31175 Wyoming 45.92506




TABLE D.2   GOVERNMENT IDEOLOGY SCORE BY STATE, 2005 RANK 
ORDERED 
 
State Government Ideology State 
Government 
Ideology 
New Mexico 91.99048 New Hampshire 46.2595
West Virginia 89.75 Wyoming 45.92506
Vermont 89.4243 Kansas 45
Louisiana 88.66666 Oklahoma 44.36544
Maine 88.59511 Arkansas 43.75
New Jersey 88.51563 Alabama 42.625
Illinois 85.06613 New York 41.10945
North Carolina 84.37583 Mississippi 40.37788
Washington 82.48286 Minnesota 38.77166
Oregon 79.35 Colorado 37.31163
Rhode Island 77.83333 Nevada 37.12738
Montana 73.14538 Kentucky 27.02015
Delaware 72.5625 North Dakota 20.14565
Connecticut 69.58334 Idaho 20
Iowa 68.91275 Indiana 18.335
Hawaii 68.84393 Nebraska 16.875
Massachusetts 68.40019 Ohio 16.57121
Michigan 62.27471 South Dakota 15.5
Tennessee 60.56313 Georgia 14.18442
Pennsylvania 60.11131 South Carolina 14.15885
Maryland 55.53125 Alaska 13.16667
Wisconsin 54.11048 Missouri 11.31175
Virginia 53.00834 Texas 10.8615
Arizona 52.875 Florida 10.3421
California 49.59286 Utah 10.125
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TABLE E.1   ELAZAR’S POLITICAL CULTURE CLASSIFICATION BY STATE 
 
Moralistic Individualistic Traditionalistic 
California Alaska Alabama 
Colorado Connecticut Arizona 
Idaho Delaware Arkansas 
Iowa Hawaii Florida 
Kansas Illinois Georgia 
Maine Indiana Kentucky 
Michigan Maryland Louisiana 
Minnesota Massachusetts Mississippi 
Montana Missouri New Mexico 
New Hampshire Nebraska North Carolina 
North Dakota Nevada Oklahoma 
Oregon New Jersey South Carolina 
South Dakota New York Tennessee 
Utah Ohio Texas 
Vermont Pennsylvania Virginia 
Washington Rhode Island West Virginia 
Wisconsin Wyoming  





























Alabama 2 24.8 7 4.5 
Alaska 19 24.9 6 12.5 
Arizona 39 20.2 30 34.5 
Arkansas 11 23.5 10 10.5 
California 31 15.2 49 40 
Colorado 49 19.8 35 42 
Connecticut 45 16.5 48 46.5 
Delaware 27 20.6 25 26 
Florida 37 21.7 19 28 
Georgia 12 22.1 17 14.5 
Hawaii N/A 17 47 47 
Idaho 36 17.9 44 40 
Illinois 22 19.9 34 28 
Indiana 9 27.3 2 5.5 
Iowa 20 20.4 28 24 
Kansas 22 17.8 45 33.5 
Kentucky 6 28.7 1 3.5 
Louisiana 4 22.6 13 8.5 
Maine 32 20.8 23 27.5 
Maryland 29 18.9 40 34.5 
Massachusetts 48 18.1 42 45 
Michigan 6 22 18 12 
Minnesota 25 20 32 28.5 
Mississippi 1 23.6 8 4.5 
Missouri 16 23.4 11 13.5 
























Nebraska 20 21.3 21 20.5 
Nevada 32 23.1 12 22 
New 
Hampshire 42 20.4 28 35 
New Jersey 39 18 43 41 
New Mexico 38 21.5 20 29 
New York 34 20.5 27 30.5 
North Carolina 16 22.6 13 14.5 
North Dakota 16 20.1 31 23.5 
Ohio 13 22.3 16 14.5 
Oklahoma 14 25.1 5 9.5 
Oregon 35 18.5 41 38 
Pennsylvania 15 23.6 8 11.5 
Rhode Island 47 19.8 35 41 
South Carolina 10 22.5 15 12.5 
South Dakota 26 19.8 35 30.5 
Tennessee 5 26.7 3 4 
Texas 6 20 32 19 
Utah 43 11.5 50 46.5 
Vermont 44 19.3 38 41 
Virginia 22 20.6 25 23.5 
Washington 29 17.6 46 37.5 
West Virginia 3 26.7 3 3 
Wisconsin 28 20.7 24 26 
Wyoming 41 21.3 21 31 
Source:  Trust for America’s Health, F as in Fat: How Obesity Politics Are Failing 
in America, 2005 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System Survey Data. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control 




TABLE F.2   OBESITY/SMOKING RANKINGS, RANK ORDERED, 2005 
 
State Obesity/Smoking Average Ranking State 
Obesity/Smoking 
Average Ranking 
West Virginia 3 Maine 27.5 
Kentucky 3.5 Florida 28 
Tennessee 4 Illinois 28 
Alabama 4.5 Minnesota 28.5 
Mississippi 4.5 New Mexico 29 
Indiana 5.5 New York 30.5 
Louisiana 8.5 South Dakota 30.5 
Oklahoma 9.5 Wyoming 31 
Arkansas 10.5 Kansas 33.5 
Pennsylvania 11.5 Arizona 34.5 
Michigan 12 Maryland 34.5 
Alaska 12.5 New Hampshire 35 
South Carolina 12.5 Washington 37.5 
Missouri 13.5 Oregon 38 
Georgia 14.5 California 40 
North Carolina 14.5 Idaho 40 
Ohio 14.5 New Jersey 41 
Texas 19 Rhode Island 41 
Nebraska 20.5 Vermont 41 
Nevada 22 Montana 41.5 
North Dakota 23.5 Colorado 42 
Virginia 23.5 Massachusetts 45 
Iowa 24 Connecticut 46.5 
Delaware 26 Utah 46.5 
Wisconsin 26 Hawaii 47 
Note: A low rank indicates a higher proportion of obese and current smoking adults 
Source:  Trust for America’s Health, F as in Fat: How Obesity Politics Are Failing 
in America, 2005 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC). Behavioral Risk 
Factor Surveillance System Survey Data. Atlanta, Georgia: U.S. 
Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Disease Control 















Average of the two 
rankings 
Alabama 45 41 43
Alaska 30 37 33.5
Arizona 31 39 35
Arkansas 47 40 43.5
California 22 18 20
Colorado 17 27 22
Connecticut 7 10 8.5
Delaware 33 35 34
Florida 40 44 42
Georgia 43 42 42.5
Hawaii 5 8 6.5
Idaho 16 20 18
Illinois 28 34 31
Indiana 32 24 28
Iowa 10 6 8
Kansas 23 15 19
Kentucky 42 32 37
Louisiana 49 50 49.5
Maine 8 5 6.5
Maryland 34 29 31.5
Massachusetts 9 3 6
Michigan 29 23 26
Minnesota 1 4 2.5
Mississippi 50 49 49.5
Missouri 35 36 35.5

















Average of the two 
rankings 
Nebraska 11 9 10
Nevada 37 47 42
New Hampshire 3 2 1.5
New Jersey 15 16 15.5
New Mexico 38 48 43
New York 26 31 28.5
North Carolina 36 33 34.5
North Dakota 6 11 8.5
Ohio 27 26 26.5
Oklahoma 44 46 45
Oregon 18 19 18.5
Pennsylvania 25 21 23
Rhode Island 12 12 12
South Carolina 46 43 44.5
South Dakota 20 22 21
Tennessee 48 38 43
Texas 39 45 42
Utah 4 7 5.5
Vermont 2 1 1.5
Virginia 24 17 20.5
Washington 14 13 13.5
West Virginia 41 28 34.5
Wisconsin 13 14 13.5
Wyoming 19 30 24.5
Note:    The least healthy states have the highest rank ordered numbers 
 
Source:  United Health Foundation, America’s Health Rankings, 2005 ed. 








TABLE F.4   STATE HEALTH RANKINGS, RANK ORDERED, 2005 
 
State 
Average of the United 
Health Foundation and 
Morgan Quitno 2005 
State Health Rankings
State 
Average of the United 
Health Foundation and 
Morgan Quitno 2005 
State Health Rankings
Louisiana 49.5 Wyoming 24.5 
Mississippi 49.5 Montana 23 
Oklahoma 45 Pennsylvania 23 
South Carolina 44.5 Colorado 22 
Arkansas 43.5 South Dakota 21 
Alabama 43 Virginia 20.5 
New Mexico 43 California 20 
Tennessee 43 Kansas 19 
Georgia 42.5 Oregon 18.5 
Florida 42 Idaho 18 
Nevada 42 New Jersey 15.5 
Texas 42 Washington 13.5 
Kentucky 37 Wisconsin 13.5 
Missouri 35.5 Rhode Island 12 
Arizona 35 Nebraska 10 
North Carolina 34.5 Connecticut 8.5 
West Virginia 34.5 North Dakota 8.5 
Delaware 34 Iowa 8 
Alaska 33.5 Hawaii 6.5 
Maryland 31.5 Maine 6.5 
Illinois 31 Massachusetts 6 
New York 28.5 Utah 5.5 
Indiana 28 Minnesota 2.5 
Ohio 26.5 New Hampshire 1.5 
Michigan 26 Vermont 1.5 
Note:    The least healthy states have the highest rank ordered numbers 
 
Source:  United Health Foundation, America’s Health Rankings, 2005 ed. 




TABLE F.5   GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PEOPLE RATING, 2005 
















Alabama C+ 2.3333 Montana C+ 2.3333
Alaska C+ 2.3333 Nebraska B- 2.6667
Arizona B  3.0000 Nevada C+ 2.3333
Arkansas C  2.0000 New Hampshire C+ 2.3333
California C- 1.6667 New Jersey B  3.0000
Colorado C+ 2.3333 New Mexico C+ 2.3333
Connecticut B  3.0000 New York B- 2.6667
Delaware B- 2.6667 North Carolina C+ 2.3333
Florida B- 2.6667 North Dakota B- 2.6667
Georgia A  4.0000 Ohio B- 2.6667
Hawaii B  3.0000 Oklahoma B- 2.6667
Idaho B  3.0000 Oregon B- 2.6667
Illinois C  2.0000 Pennsylvania B- 2.6667
Indiana C  2.0000 Rhode Island D+ 1.3333
Iowa B  3.0000 South Carolina A- 3.6667
Kansas B- 2.6667 South Dakota B- 2.6667
Kentucky B  3.0000 Tennessee C- 1.6667
Louisiana B  3.0000 Texas B  3.0000
Maine B- 2.6667 Utah B+ 3.3333
Maryland B- 2.6667 Vermont B  3.0000
Massachusetts C+ 2.3333 Virginia A- 3.6667
Michigan B  3.0000 Washington B+ 3.3333
Minnesota B+ 3.3333 West Virginia C  2.0000
Mississippi C+ 2.3333 Wisconsin B  3.0000
Missouri B- 2.6667 Wyoming D+ 1.3333
Source: The Pew Center for the States (2005).  Government Performance Project, 











TABLE F.6   GOVERNMENT PERFORMANCE PROJECT, PEOPLE RATING, 2005 
















Georgia        A  4 New York       B- 2.6667
South 
Carolina A- 3.6667 North Dakota   B- 2.6667
Virginia       A- 3.6667 Ohio           B- 2.6667
Minnesota      B+ 3.3333 Oklahoma       B- 2.6667
Utah           B+ 3.3333 Oregon         B- 2.6667
Washington     B+ 3.3333 Pennsylvania   B- 2.6667
Arizona        B  3 South Dakota   B- 2.6667
Connecticut    B  3 Alabama        C+ 2.3333
Hawaii         B  3 Alaska         C+ 2.3333
Idaho          B  3 Colorado       C+ 2.3333
Iowa           B  3 Massachusetts  C+ 2.3333
Kentucky       B  3 Mississippi    C+ 2.3333
Louisiana      B  3 Montana        C+ 2.3333
Michigan       B  3 Nevada         C+ 2.3333
New Jersey     B  3 New Hampshire  C+ 2.3333
Texas          B  3 New Mexico    C+ 2.3333
Vermont        B  3 North Carolina C+ 2.3333
Wisconsin      B  3 Arkansas       C  2
Delaware       B- 2.6667 Illinois       C  2
Florida        B- 2.6667 Indiana        C  2
Kansas         B- 2.6667 West Virginia  C  2
Maine          B- 2.6667 California     C- 1.6667
Maryland       B- 2.6667 Tennessee      C- 1.6667
Missouri       B- 2.6667 Rhode Island   D+ 1.3333
Nebraska       B- 2.6667 Wyoming        D+ 1.3333
Source: The Pew Center for the States (2005).  Government Performance Project, 





TABLE F.7   AVERAGE AGE OF STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, 2002 











Alabama        42.75 New Hampshire  44.00
Alaska         44.00 New Jersey     45.00
Arizona        44.00 New Mexico     42.25
Arkansas       44.00 New York       45.25
California     42.75 North Carolina 42.75
Colorado       44.50 North Dakota   45.00
Delaware       41.50 Ohio           48.00
Georgia        43.00 Oklahoma       45.00
Idaho          47.00 Oregon         44.00
Illinois       45.25 Pennsylvania   46.00
Indiana        45.00 Rhode Island   48.00
Iowa           46.00 South Carolina 44.00
Kansas         44.75 South Dakota   43.00
Kentucky       43.00 Texas          42.50
Louisiana      43.00 Utah           42.00
Michigan       44.00 Vermont        43.50
Minnesota      46.00 Virginia       44.50
Mississippi    42.25 Washington     47.00
Missouri       42.00 Wisconsin      44.25
Montana        45.00 Wyoming        44.50
Nevada         44.25  
Data not available for Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, 
Tennessee, West Virginia 
 





TABLE F.8   AVERAGE AGE OF STATE GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES, 2002 











Delaware       41.5 Nevada         44.25
Missouri       42 Wisconsin      44.25
Utah           42 Colorado       44.5
Mississippi    42.25 Virginia       44.5
New Mexico     42.25 Wyoming        44.5
Texas          42.5 Kansas         44.75
Alabama        42.75 Indiana        45
California     42.75 Montana        45
North Carolina 42.75 New Jersey     45
Georgia        43 North Dakota   45
Kentucky       43 Oklahoma       45
Louisiana      43 Illinois       45.25
South Dakota   43 New York       45.25
Vermont        43.5 Iowa           46
Alaska         44 Minnesota      46
Arizona        44 Pennsylvania   46
Arkansas       44 Idaho          47
Michigan       44 Washington     47
New Hampshire  44 Ohio           48
Oregon         44 Rhode Island   48
South Carolina 44  
Data not available for Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nebraska, 
Tennessee, West Virginia 
 
Source: Carroll and Moss (2002), State Employee Worker Shortage, the Impending Crisis 
 
